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Abstract
This thesis examines historical writing by drawing on the works of historians,
philosophers, theorists and intellectuals, from antiquity to the contemporary moment. In
order to answer the demand for scholarship that assembles insights of the Annales
historians with other French intellectuals, I treat historians as theorists and theorists as
historians. Through the course of my analysis, I examine issues of historical writing such
as the scope of historical research and the historian’s task and place; I treat theoretical
questions of constructivism, potentiality, agency, causality, teleology, and politics. In
order to consolidate these issues into a single analysis, my research spans across
disciplinary boundaries. Through an engagement with the methodological and political
criticisms of Michel Foucault and Jacques Rancière, I argue in favor of an archival
research method that avoids the pitfalls of positivistic analysis and the excesses of
procedural refinement, which often serve to narrow the scope of historical research.
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Jacques Le Goff

Introduction: History and Theory
The subject of this thesis is historiography: problems that relate to historical
writing and satisfactory historical explanation. In so doing, I aimed to avoid the
relativistic conclusions of theorists such as Keith Jenkins, and to write about the
philosophy of history without focusing on Hegel’s system. This thesis contains a
conceptual history of “the event,” tracing the roots of this concept to a group of
historians known as the Annales. Further, I claim to develop an analytic using the
categories of the philosophy of history to analyze the politics of historiography.
This thesis began as an analysis of ‘historical theory,’ with the hopes of either
encountering or developing a philosophy of history both relevant to political and social
problems and conversant with the fashionable lines of contemporary academic inquiry.
This hope was quickly tempered, and piece by piece, a research agenda congealed
around my readings. Through the course of my analysis, I propose to consolidate the
issues raised by disciplinary boundaries that threatened historical research and the selfreflexive auto critique familiar to Anglophone scholars under the heading of “French
Theory.” Through the course of my analysis, I examine issues of historical writing such
as the scope of historical research and the historian’s task and place; I treat theoretical
questions of constructivism, potentiality, agency, causality, teleology, and politics.
Further, through an engagement with the methodological and political criticisms of
Michel Foucault and Jacques Rancière, I argue in favor of an archival research method
which avoids the pitfalls of positivistic analysis and the excesses of procedural
refinement, so that the object of historical research might be given new life through the
principles of historical reconstruction.
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Two turning points of my research seem especially pertinent. First, as I initially
set out to understand historiography as a field that developed from ancient insight and
slowly became the modern form we know today, I took the object of my study as the
history of historiographic statements from Herodotus onwards. In the first summer of
my research, I was struck by the following passage of John Burrow’s discussion of
Thucydides found in A History of Histories, where he writes:
Historians, one is glad to be able to assert, have generally done better
than their programmatic formulations of their task have suggested, which
is one reason why discussions of the nature of historiography based on
such formulations are so inadequate. (Burrow, 49)
In my estimation, this passage undercuts a fair amount of academic commentaries,
which focus on the programmatic statements of historians and attempt to judge their
merit on these sorts of statements. An example would be Thucydides’ commentary on
the ancient convention of developing speeches for historical figures in which he claimed
“to make the speakers say what, in my opinion, was called for by each situation”
(Thucydides, 1.22, p. 47).
Generally speaking, such programmatic statements are more of interest to
philosophers than they are to historians. Many analytical philosophers have attempted
to demonstrate that historians lacked the epistemic justification for their claims, and
these efforts were generally ignored by practicing historians. Often, this is for good
reason. A survey of the 1962 Symposium Philosophy and History, edited by Sidney Hook,
is rife with unflattering portraits. Ernest Negal demonstrates the sort of condescension
with which philosophers have regarded historians:
Like other intellectual workers, professional historians are rarely selfconscious about the organizing concepts of the principles for assessing
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evidence which they habitually employ in their discipline… When
historians do express themselves on such issues, they are therefore likely
to voice philosophical ideas imbibed by chance during their school days
or in their desultory reading, but which they have seldom subjected to
rigorous criticism in the light of their own professional experience.
(Negal, 76)
As John Zammito, in A Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography, writes,
this issue of philosophers asserting the naivety of historians has become somewhat a
perennial problem between the disciplines:
A consideration of the last century shows repeated instances of
philosophy coming forward to serve as conceptual warden for
historiography, uninvited and unappreciated by historians. In the last
decades a similar intervention has arisen from literary “theory,” and,
again, historiography has been “invited” to construe its disciplinary
practice under the auspices of another. (Zammito, 64)
In writing this thesis, I attempted to apply Burrow’s caveat; I also do not take the
programmatic statements of historians at their word, or attempt to develop a “theory” of
history that ought to supervise historians at work. Nevertheless, I have strong interests
in problems of historical method, and sought to apply these interests within the present
work in a fashion more amenable to the practical conditions of writing history, or, in a
word, historiography.
I trust that the above controversy is reason enough to explain why I centered the
first chapter on the conflict of the faculties within the social sciences and the humanities.
Why, however, did I choose to focus almost exclusively on French sources? Here, I must
acknowledge a debt to the works of Paul Ricœur.
The most stimulating piece of my early research was Ricœur’s Zararoff Lecture
for 1978-9, “The Contribution of French Historiography to the Theory of History,” not
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only due to my nostalgia for the city of spires. I found Ricœur’s account rife with
references to the primary works of historians, especially of the Annales, put into
conversation, rather than into opposition, with the works of philosophers such as Robert
Mandrou. There I found a model of the scholarship needed within what is known as
historical theory, following the suggestive works of scholars such as Reinhardt
Koselleck. The scene of Anglophone scholarship, laden with demands for certainty and
finality in historical judgement, often contains condescension towards historians that in
turn fuels historians’ antipathy towards the philosophy of history. Where the
Anglophone analytical philosophy of history perpetuated an opposition between
historians and philosophers, Parisian intellectuals promoted synthetic and accumulative
analyses, in which the distinction between historian and theorist was happily blurred.
While Ricœur alerted me to a wealth of sources, and in that respect, shaped the
course of my analysis, I did take pains to ensure that our works did not overlap. Instead,
I took my locus to be within the shadow of magisterial analyses such as Memory, History,
Forgetting and Time and Narrative. I found the sections on some theorists, such as Michel
Foucault and Jacques Rancière, to be suggestive but in need of narrower and more
extensive controversy.
Perhaps, in many respects, this narrowing field of focus resulted in fashioning a
pair of blinders in the course of my analyses. In some respects, I cannot doubt that this
occurred, and will address these myriad inadequacies in my conclusion. I would like to
think that in some instances, the fault lies with the contemporary state of academic
conventions, which promotes singular efforts on the part of academics, rather than
group or team based research. There is no substitution for well written analyses when
one intends to venture deeply into the clefts and secret places of the archive. With the
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works of Ricœur I would also add Martin Kusch’s Foucault’s Strata and Fields; the works
of Peter Burke, especially New Perspectives on Historical Writing and The French Historical
Revolution. The most stimulating primary sources were the works of Roger Chartier, as
well as the collection by Jacques Revel and Lynn Hunt, Histories: French Constructions of
the Past, which contains a wealth of primary source material for those interested in
furthering or surpassing my research. I am indebted to the attention of my superiors, as
well as my colleges, as each conversation was precious and enriching.
I ask pardon from my readers for my anecdotes. The above was written in order
to elucidate my initial choice of subject material and organization, which might
otherwise appear idiosyncratic. This glimpse is not intended to justify my project,
though, I must add that the interior resources developed through experience require
expression to foster empathy. Without respect and mutual trust, what would a
community of scholars be but a “band of thieves”? (De civitate dei, IV, 4). By advocating
for the relevance of experience, I do not intend to present them in the absence of
rigorous conceptual supplement.
Having indicated that Burrow’s caveat altered the course of my analysis, we now
turn to the place of theoretical historiographic observations within Theory and
Continental Philosophy. In Telling the Truth about History, we read:
New cultural theories, including postmodernist ones, have helped, like
their predecessors, to revitalize discussion about methods, goals and even
the foundations of knowledge. Provocative and unsettling, they raise
questions that demand some new answers. (Appleby et al, 305)
Partially, my agenda was to highlight the unsettling and provocative claims of
historians, which, subjected to the cyclic oscillations of intellectual history, have fallen
out of academic fashion (Ziolkowski, 199). Readers of Theory and philosophy will be
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familiar with the contemporary resurgence of interest of the concept of “the event,” for
example, in the works of Martin Heidegger or Alain Badiou. Invoking “the event”
typically connotes a rupture of temporal continuity, whether this is a prognostic percept
or an ex post facto excavation. Part of this thesis is a conceptual history of “the event”
which traces its prominence to the Annales historians, who sought to undermine eventbased histories. It must be noted, however, that my analysis is not simply a ‘search for
origins,’ of a fashionable concept. Instead, by analyzing the manner in which historians
such as Bloch and Febvre crafted histories that either had no pivotal events or focused
on the effects of events which did not occur. For historians, such works inaugurate a
shift that can be understood as a movement away from empirically verifiable
phenomena in their documented actuality, and towards an architectonic of possibility.
This new history reinvigorated old controversies. For example, histories that develop
these architectonics of possibility, such as Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie’s Montaillou: The
Promised Land of Error, present the reader with a collection of possible configurations as a
more or less closed system. Such sections beg the question of determination; are these
caches deterministic, like laws, or variable generalizations? Here, the distinction
between nomothetic and idiographic explanation takes on a new importance. New
techniques of historical writing reinvigorate the use of concepts from the philosophy of
history as analytic tools.
Within this thesis, concepts from the philosophy of history are generally used as
analytics, as I saw fit to limit my analysis to the question of historical writing. Questions
of the ontological or epistemic status of the past, the traditional fare of the philosophy of
history, were beyond the scope of my analysis. Partially, this choice reflects my own
conviction that such questions beg extremes, and for that reason, have little relevance for
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historians. Whether the past is absolutely real or irrevocably lost is of little concern to
that fact that various text effects have enabled historians to produce works that grant us
insight into the remote past. How exactly these effects are possible, and the truth status
of these text effects, are both matters of hermeneutics, which would require
consolidating the exegetical and speculative methods of philosophy with historical
material. While this appeared promising to me at first glance, the idea of a singular
theory of history seems to beg many questions best characterized as epistemological in
nature, which would center the concerns of philosophers over and against those of
historians.
Of course, I do not intend to draw a strict division between philosophical and
historical justifications. My reading of the Annales demonstrates that while these
historians were engaged in the reinvigoration of historical study, they did so by way of
philosophical justifications. These justifications were neither epistemological nor
ontological, as many positivistic justifications are, but rather methodological and
political. Historians such as Braudel offer methodological justifications of historical
practice, such as his theory of temporal stratification, which entailed that history takes
place at three levels, the short term, the conjunctural and the long term, immobile
history of geographic and meteorological change. Such a justification supports a “clear
hierarchy of explanation,” yet depends on a notion of duration, which becomes the
subject of Foucault’s critique (Appleby et al, 308). Historians such as Jules Michelet and
Lucien Febvre offered political justifications for their works, especially in regards to the
“history from below,” accounts which focus on popular culture, demographic, economic
and material realities of subaltern groups.
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Subsequent chapters focus on the theoretical contributions of Michel Foucault,
and then Jacques Rancière, whom I consider to be historians in their own right. In their
own way, these figures enable us to distance our account of historiography from
hermeneutic concerns which would resolve in ontological and epistemological
statements, in order to promote a more tempered balance between the nomothetic and
idiographic aspects of historical inquiry. Their engagement with the methodological and
political justifications of the Annales enables us to further enquire into the political, as
well as the text effects or poetic aspects, of historiography. However, the most direct
reason for reading these thinkers together is the fact that neither allows his thought on
history to lapse into a unity in the manner characteristic of what is typically invoked by
the phrase ‘philosophy of history.’ To oversimplify the point, each in his own way
succeeds in affirming some multiplicity over transcendental unity.
Foucault’s archeological method is indebted to the contributions of the Annales.
He argues in favor of a more radical application of the notion of duration to the concept
of event. In doing so, Foucault attempts to suppress a number of historiographic themes
and conventions associated with Hegelian dialectics, such as teleology and progressive
development. Foucault advocates for a non-teleological historiography, in which the
past is not an origin of the present, but a terminus in its own right. Foucault proceeds
primarily by detaching historiography from its humanistic commitments, and in doing
so, does not develop a convincing account of politics.
Where Foucault’s contributions fall short, Rancière’s intervention begins. I focus
on his interrogation of the political justifications offered by the Annales. Rancière’s
radical critique attempts to subvert the logic of representation, both poetic and political.
Where Aristotle’s Poetics defines poetics as mimesis, Rancière advances a non-mimetic
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theory of poetics in order to undermine the connection between political representation
and political credential. Where the “history from below” is justified by practitioners as
an extension of real political representation, Rancière argues that the historian presents
the subaltern, specifically the poor, as objects through scientific means such as
demography and economics. Rancière’s intervention is especially pertinent in that it
allows us to connect the issues of historiographic reconstruction with the political
currency proposed therein.
In assessing the contributions of Foucault, I argue that we ought to apply the
analytic of nomothetic and idiographic concepts. Ultimately I claim that Foucault’s
archeological method overemphasizes the constraints of law and structure, and has
difficulty accounting for diachronic change, due to his abandonment of the logic of
causality. In assessing the contributions of Rancière, I argue that his promotion of the
voices of the past, à la Michelet, risks re-establishing some poetic conventions of
positivism.
As it stands, this thesis complements my undergraduate work on the German
tradition of the critical philosophy of history. While my interest in learning more about
recent and contemporary French historiography was a driving force for my research,
this interest cannot provide a justification for my study. My intent for providing these
careful readings is therefore to attest to the importance of historical theory for
considering theoretical problems such as “the event,” potentiality, causality, and
political and mimetic representation. History, practiced as a tempered balance between
nomothetic and idiographic methods, houses unique scenarios of enormous pedagogic
worth. It is my conviction that historiography represents what we could call a “minor
literature” typically neglected by scholars, even within interdisciplinary fields such as
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Theory and Criticism. Renewed interest and attention to these archives will grant new
sense and direction to scholars working on similar problems.
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Chapter 1: The Historiography of the Annales Historians
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Part of my agenda in this chapter is to fill the gaps in scholarship about the
theoretical contributions of the Annales. Scholarship on the theoretical import of the
Annales historians has been formalized in its Anglophone reception. Typical accounts
focus on an “Annales paradigm” or offer Braudel’s ideas of temporal stratification. In
such accounts the work of one historian is thought sufficient to explain the work of the
group and its affiliates—a reductive approach which fails to contextualize the
historiographic theories of the Annalistes with other developments of interest to
Anglophone scholars.
This chapter presents several trajectories of the Annales School that are pertinent
to our discussion of historiography in French Theory, which include the problems of
interdisciplinary research, structure, and method. These issues are explored with
reference to the antimony between idiographic and nomothetic analysis, the questions
raised by (relatively) novel areas of historical research, the controversy between older
methods and the incorporation of scientific data, and the fascinating and challenging
histoire des mentalités. This chapter establishes a number of basic terminological and
factual aspects of later chapters, and for that reason, consists of a synthetic survey of a
large number of historical works.

The Methodenstreit and Positivism
During the 20th century, the French academy underwent a massive reshuffling of
the disciplines, resultant from the development of new fields such as anthropology and
sociology. Immanuel Wallerstein, in his “Annales: The War on Two Fronts,” argues that
the Annales were engaged in “the Methodenstreit … the ostensibly central debate of late
nineteenth century social science… the conflict between the so-called nomothetic and
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idiographic approaches to the study of man and society” (Wallerstein, 85). During this
time, sociology, anthropology, psychology and other emergent fields produced
apologetics: texts defining each field’s preview within the academy. These texts expound
methodological justifications, and often attempt to sequester the various disciplines. I
argue that the institutional form of history resulting from these sectarian debates
inspired the theoretical innovations of Annales historians, who could be credited with a
revitalization of the discipline of history in the 20th century. Most Annales historians did
not explicitly theorize their practice. In this introductory chapter, we will analyze some
of the rare and influential theoretical considerations of Annalistes in the context of this
conflict of the faculties over method.
Prominent anthropologists and sociologists, in an attempt to secure the place of
their fields within the social sciences, wrote apologetics that expounded methodological
justifications. An example of an apologetic attempt to define the field can be found in
Lévi-Strauss’ Structural Anthropology, where Lévi-Strauss opposes history to sociology,
presenting sociology as a nomothetic field and history as an idiographic field. LéviStrauss argues that historians produce “documentary and functional” observations – not
“comparative” studies (Lévi-Strauss, 1). The idiographic view of history privileges
political and narrative histories insofar as they study unique historical objects, for
example, contingent trains of events. On similar terms, Émile Durkheim writes that
History can only be a science on condition that it raises itself above the
particular, but then it is the case that it ceases to be itself, and becomes a
branch of sociology… history can remain a distinct discipline only if it
confines itself to the study of each individual nation, taken by itself, and
considered at the different moments of its development. (Durkheim, 78)

Guzzi 14

Exclusive focus on the unique and singular aspects of history denies the incorporation of
structural elements into historical accounts. Durkheim considered these structures to be
the prerogative of ethnography. If this were so, both Marxist style recourse to economic
and social structure, as well as cultural history in the style of Jules Michelet or Fustel de
Coulanges would be ousted from the domain of legitimate historical explanation.
At first glance, the difference between the idiographic and nomothetic study
would appear to lie in the choice of historical object, but each actually would privilege a
different kind of explanation. The former, intent on describing non-repeatable sequences
of events, has recourse to the agency of historical actors in explanation. The latter, intent
on describing serial and immobile historical structures, has recourse to structural
constraints on agents and historical forces. Two competing explanations could be
developed for the same event along these lines. Did ‘orders arrive late from Madrid
because Philip II could not make up his mind what to do’ – or – did ‘orders arrive late
from Madrid because sixteenth century ships took several weeks to cross the
Mediterranean’ (Burke, 236)? Hopefully, a proper resolution would recognize that both
structural and agentic variables are important considerations for historical explanation,
and neither could be preferred to the other in all cases1. Looked at from the perspective
of historical writing, the idiographic-nomothetic antimony results in competing forms of
explanation, however, the mutual exclusivity of these forms of explanation ought to be
considered an exaggerated result of the conflict of faculties. History as a discipline does
not benefit from being pigeonholed in either camp.

See Giddens, Anthony. "Elements of the Theory of Structuration." The Constitution of Society:
Outline of the Theory of Structuration. Cambridge: Polity, 1984, 1-34.
1
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Given how artificial the nomothetic-idiographic distinction is for historiography,
the Annales historians fought what Wallerstein referred to as “a war on two fronts.” The
journal Annales d’histoire économique et sociale was a zone of contention and is
retrospectively considered to be “the single most important forum for the revitalization
of historical studies in the Western world” (Hughes, 19). Whereas the Annalistes were
famously polemical, and interested in engaging these new debates, other historians
attempted to secure the place of academic history by developing it as a science. A
codified method for training historians is exemplified by Charles-Victor Langlois and
Charles Seignobos’ Introduction aux études historiques of 1898 (Revel, 6). The positivistic
view of history remains important as a foil against which to situate our observations
about Annales historiographic theory.
Our treatment of positivism is twofold. First, I will present some aspects of the
positivism of Henry Thomas Buckle, whose reflections offer insight into positivism as a
historical research agenda. Next, in order to connect our reflections to the French
academic scene, we will briefly attend to the école méthodique that rose to prominence
between 1860 and 1914.
Henry Thomas Buckle’s History of Civilization in England (1851-1861) begins with
an overview of his research agenda, which proposes to apply positivist philosophy to
the study of history. Several points of his agenda are relevant to our understanding of
positivism as a historical research agenda. Buckle aims to model history on natural
science:
I hope to accomplish for the history of man something equivalent, or at
all events analogous, to what has been effected by other inquirers for the
different branches of natural science. In regards to nature, events
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apparently the most irregular and capricious have been explained, and
have been shown to be in accordance with certain fixed and universal
laws. This has been done because men of ability… have studied natural
events with the view of discovering their regularity: and if human events
were subjected to similar treatment, we have every right to expect similar
results. (Buckle, 125)
As a doctrine, historical positivism aims to find order and regularity in the apparent
disorder of historical phenomena, development and trends. For this purpose, it adopts
the methodology of natural science insofar as this is possible (some aspects of the
scientific method, like experimentation, cannot be applied to historical study). It is
important for our purposes to recognize that historical positivism, by having a general
research method, does not analyze particular problems raised by historical material. By
this, I mean to oppose the problem oriented historical research of the Annales with the
nomothetic research agenda of historical positivism. A further significant difference is
found in Buckle’s claim that historical “observations are more liable to those causes of
error which arise from prejudice and passion” (Buckle 125). In other words, the opinions
of the historian ought not to enter into her research, according to Buckle and other
positivists.
While Buckle has been useful as a source for the doctrine of historical positivism,
his work did not occasion the Annales in the manner that French historians did. Further,
French historical positivism has notable conceptual differences from English historical
positivism. However, the “positivist” label is contested in scholarly research, as it was
applied, primarily by the Annales, retrospectively to a group of historians. The Annales
School: An Intellectual History by André Burguière contains a section entitled “Did the
Positivist Turn of French Historians Exist?”. Burguière demonstrates that the historians
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later branded “positivist” were also motivated by the increasing influence of sociology
in the French academy, and fought the annexation of history by “laying claim to a risky
epistemological singularity, that of being the science of what occurs only once”
(Burguière, 62). However, the hegemony of these historians over the entirety of the
French academic scene was exaggerated by Febvre and other first generation Annalistes.
Isabel Noronha-Divanna, in Writing History in the Third Republic, claims that these
French “positivists” ought to be known as école méthodique historians, which includes
Hippolyte Taine, Ernest Renan, Fustel de Coulanges, Gabriel Monod, Ernest Lavisse,
Charles-Victor Langlois and Charles Seignobos (Noronha-Divanna, 3). Historians of the
école méthodique rose to prominence between 1860 and 1914, and sought a scientific
method for history which would eliminate disagreement and promote unity at the
national political level (Noronha-Divanna, 29). She writes:
After 1870, four elements of history-writing in the Third Republic can be
seen as key to understanding the new positivistic attitude towards
history: a heightened concern for explaining the role of history as an
instrument of the state; an effort to secularize education; thirdly,
nationalism replacing cosmopolitanism in Parisian academia; fourthly, a
rejection of German scholarship in dealing with historical sources and
facts. (Noronha-Divanna, 35)
These features of historical positivism were particular to French historians, who, unlike
English historians such as Buckle, were at pains to distinguish their methods from
sociology, and German historical scholarship. In its French iteration, the école méthodique
variety of positivism narrowed the scope of historical research, in an attempt to secure
ground from sociology. In connecting history with the state, the école méthodique contains
a political orientation which further narrows the subject matter of history. Along with
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narrowing the field of possible research, the école méthodique has implications for the role
of the historian, which are important for our consideration of the Annalistes response.
Carrard, in Poetics of the New History, presents a perspective of the positivistic
view, which suggests that the role of the historian is to act as an arbiter between
documents and facts, given their condemnation of “personal, patriotic, moral or
metaphysical considerations” in historical writing (Carrad, 7). In other words, the
positivistic historian attempted to refrain from sharing insight or conviction, in order to
downplay authorial intrusion. Further, these historians “prescribe the observation of
chronological order” as a principle of historiography (Carrad, 7). Such considerations
inadvertently narrow the scope of possible historical research to well documented
periods and events. While this may seem trivial, the artificial demand for this type of
evidence privileges an entire set of historical circumstances – the literacy of the
monasteries and upper classes, and the importance of urban places over, for example,
rural settings. The Annales historians fought in favor of these innovations, though there
is no Annales manual,2 some theoretical synthesis of myriad innovations. Instead,
throughout the rest of the chapter, I will analyze the theoretical aspects of the work of
Marc Bloch, Lucien Febvre, Fernand Braudel, Jacques Le Goff, and Phillippe Ariès.
Marc Bloch and Fernand Braudel: Structure and Method
The oeuvre of Marc Bloch attests to a set of principles that informed his work.
These principles include authorial intervention, an expanded sense of evidence and the
use of ad hoc hermeneutic methods. In sum, these principles result in a non-positivistic
historiography. Where positivist historiography relies on the ‘discovery’ of historical

Braudel’s attempt at a textbook, A History of Civilization did not become incorporated into the
French academy.
2
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facts, Bloch’s work attests to the alternative notion that historical facts are constructed.
Further, Bloch’s historiography is far from documentary positivism, in that it promotes
new areas of research, such as agrarian history. While Bloch never authored an explicitly
theoretical text, his reflections on historical writing were recorded in his unfinished
Apologie pour l’historie, ou Métier d’historien, or in English: The Historian’s Craft.
In The Historian’s Craft, Bloch makes no secret of the fact that he considers
historians to be more than arbiters of facts; as he puts it, “the historian is not… that
rather grumpy examining magistrate whose unfaltering portrait is easily imposed upon
the unwary by certain introductory manuals” (HC, 90). Verification of primary sources,
as positivists suggest, is only one feature of historical research, which requires an
extraneous set of questions in order to be a meaningful exercise. Documentary evidence
is not limited to the surface claims of documentary materials. Bloch writes that “because
history has tended to make more and more frequent use of unintentional evidence, it can
no longer confine itself to weighing the explicit assertions of the documents. It has been
necessary to wring from them further confessions which they had never intended to
give” (HC, 89). In his The Judge and the Historian, Carlo Ginzburg claims that Bloch and
Febvre proved, contrary to their positivist contemporaries, that “nonexistent phenomena
and falsified documents” are of historical importance. In fact, nonexistent phenomena
feature prominently in Bloch’s The Royal Touch. How could non-existent phenomena be
the subject of historical intrigue? Ginzburg writes that “the nonexistence of the bands of
brigands renders more significant (because more profound and revealing) the fear that
spread among the French peasants in the summer of 1789” (Ginzburg, 17). The methods
for exploring possibilities within a specific historical locale will be returned to later in
this chapter.
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Within Bloch’s works the use of evidence is likened to the use of testimony – in
all its uncertainties and heteroglossia - which Bloch calls the ‘dialectic of the criticism of
testimony’ (HC, 110). Here the applications of techniques perfected by previous scholars
are apparent. Were we to search for an Ur-text, Spinoza’s biblical exegesis in TheologicalPolitical Treatise or Vico’s discovery of the true Homer in The New Science both use
critical documentary analysis on the explicit statements within the texts in question. In
either case, the document is submitted to an internal analysis, which Bloch uses the
phrase “psychological analysis” to denote. Such psychological analysis of texts
“conforms to no mechanical rules,” and so cannot be reduced to formulaic method (HC,
111). Whereas the positivistic views that Bloch reacts against attempt to impose a
method uniformly across all documentary materials, Bloch himself confirms the
importance of hermeneutic approaches to idiographic analysis, performed on the basis
of an operative set of questions the historian brings to the document in question. The ad
hoc method is an example of the historian’s authorial intervention into the archive.
Agrarian history is precisely the sort of inquiry which troubled the
methodological commitments of positivistic history qua documentary analysis. In French
Rural History, Bloch develops a method suitable to the historical object in question, a
regressive method that proceeds from knowns to unknowns:
When Durkheim was embarking on a course of lectures on the family he
once said ‘to understand the past one must first leave it’. That is true. But
it can also happen that one must first look at the present in order to
understand the past… this is the method imposed on agrarian studies by
the present state of evidence. (FRH, xxvi)
Agrarian history requires methods which work against the flow of time, and which
often work in the absence of documentary evidence. In an informative anecdote, Bloch
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refers to a letter to Fustel de Coulanges in which an English historian asked him whether
France ever had “the open field system with long furlongs” common to England. Fustel
De Coulanges answered in the negative, and incorrectly, Bloch speculates, due to his
exclusive reliance on the testimony found in documents. Bloch writes, “it is quite
probable that he never took any special notice of the characteristic pattern of ploughlands visible all over northern and eastern France which so irresistibly call to mind the
open-fields of England” (FRH, xxvii). In this case, seeking the origin or root cause in
ancient documents is a much less effective method than comparing the field structures
against English examples, or, as Bloch did, consulting survey officials (FRH, 59). Bloch’s
expanded sense of suitable evidence for historical inquiry challenges the patient
documentary style of history common to traditional historical themes of nation state and
politics.
As the anecdote illustrates, Bloch used material evidence as a supplement to
documentary evidence. An example of material evidence can be found in French Rural
History, where Bloch compares two systems: open and enclosed fields. Of the closed
fields, he writes, “as in the regions of open-fields, these material manifestations were the
outward expression of underlying social realities” (FRH, 57). These underlying social
realities are obscure due to the fact that they were scarcely written about. In Bloch’s
work, material becomes the historian’s trace of underlying social realities, which are not
chronologically reconstructed - but understood as attesting to structural possibilities
within the two regimes, which were governed by distinct attitudes. Bloch’s work on
agrarian history is an exemplary use of indirect evidence from historical sources. Within
the Annales trajectory, Bloch’s theoretical contributions were practiced without
armature, hence relatively unpretentious.
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Braudel’s contribution to the ‘war on two fronts’ was backed by a distinct
theoretical armature: his theory of temporal stratification. Simply put, Braudel
distinguished multiple senses of time, which he differentiated with recourse to temporal
duration. Through his theory of temporal stratification, Braudel elaborates a research
agenda which seeks to combine both nomothetic and idiographic observation. In doing
so, he overcomes the antimony, at least from the perspective of historical writing. He
writes in History and Sociology that
History exists at different levels, I would even go as far as to say three
levels… on the surface, the history of events works itself out in the short
term: it is a sort of microhistory. Halfway down, a history of conjunctures
follows a broader, slower rhythm… and over and above the ‘recitatif’ of
the conjuncture, structural history, or the history of the longue durée
inquires into whole centuries at a time. (OH, 74)
Both Braudel’s The Mediterranean and Civilization and Capitalism are divided into three
volumes which roughly correspond to the above temporal stratifications. Analysis of the
final stratum, the longue durée, is akin to structural history, the analysis of repetitive and
unchanging elements that structure the agencies and forces that exist at the lower strata.3
He writes:
It functions along the border between the moving and the immobile, and
because of the long-standing stability of its values, it appears unchanging
compared with all the histories which flow and work themselves out
more swiftly, and which in the final analysis gravitate around it. (OH, 74)

Christopher Lloyd’s The Structures of History (1993) advocates for socio-historical realism in the
face of the relativism implied by strictly idiographic approaches. Immanuel Wallerstein’s three
part Modern World System has aspirations to total history, and continues where Braudel’s
Civilization and Capitalism ends.
3
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There could be nothing further from the traditional chronicles of political events. Within
this temporal stratum are the unchanging and stable structural continuities that underlie
chronological analysis. Braudel’s The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age
of Philip II begins with an analysis of these immobile structures: the features, resources
and dispersion of mountains, hills, plains, seas, coasts and islands, climate, seasons and
other natural cycles. Here, historical analysis is seen to be comfortable with a nomothetic
approach; or, in Braudel’s words, these movements “govern the life of man” (MW, v.1,
102).
Braudel considered the idiographic element of history to lie in the shortest time
span: that of events. While that may seem uncontroversial, it is not – there is a lack of
consensus over what the basic unit of historical analysis is or ought to be. Braudel
distinguished two kinds of events, the unique and non-repeatable, and the serial or
repetitive event. The former, classically considered by outsiders to be the purview of
history, was his target, though he did not deny the allure of unique events. He writes,
“Like any historian, I am attracted to the unique event, which blooms for but a single
day and then fades, never to be held between one’s fingers” (OH, 67). The allure of the
event does not justify exclusive attention to it. Braudel instead envisions a history that is
not confined to individual events:
To transcend the event means transcending the short time span in which
it is set, the time span of the chronicle, or of journalism—the brief
moments of awareness whose traces give us such a vivid sense of the
events and lives of the past. It means asking if over and above the passage
of events, there is not an unconscious, or rather a more or less conscious,
history which to a great extent escapes the awareness of the actors,
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whether victors or victims: they make history, but history bears them
along. (OH, 67)
It seems important to note that while his vision incorporates both long term and short
term analysis into a single history, Braudel claims that while the scale of history
increases, the awareness of historical agents ceases to be of use for the historian. This is a
point to which I will return in chapter 3. The merging of distinct time scales into a single
model of explanation should also be a claim met with skepticism, as Braudel is often at
pains to explain how distinct temporal strata interact. Important to our purposes,
however, is the manner in which Braudel claims that both structural and event oriented
explanation fall within the purview of history in a single research agenda.
Historie des Mentalités
Through the controversy of nomothetic/idiographic distinction in the context of
the Methodenstreit, our analysis has primarily straddled the relationship between
anthropology, history and sociology. However, an analysis of the Annales historians
would be incomplete without reference to the relationship of history to another
emergent social science, namely, psychology. With this shift in register, we enter the
territory of the Annales, which is most resistant to the use of laws and structures in
historical explanation. As I aim to prove in this section, the historical objects studied
within the historie des mentalités cannot be explained with recourse to nomothetic
principles. I argue that there are two types of inquiry into collective psychology: the
synchronic and the serial.
Works within the histoire des mentalités seek to understand a past moment as a
microcosm, preserving the interior space of a collective. In doing so, Annales historians
have produced portraits of past peoples with their alterity intact. With that said, among
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the Annales there is no clear consensus about what mentalités, in general, consists.
Jacques Le Goff is quick to concede the ambiguity of the term, and there exists
Anglophone literature, such as Llyod’s Demystifying Mentalités, which probes whether or
not mentalités are explanatorily useful in historical accounts. Le Goff writes, “the primary
attraction of the histoire des mentalités lies in its vagueness: it can be used to refer to the
left-overs, the indefinable residue of historical analysis” (‘Constructing the Past,’ p. 166).
Perhaps the ambiguities are necessary, for the histoire des mentalités promised to study
aspects of the historical past which were left out of traditional historiography. In some
sense, the idea seems akin to Cornelius Castoriadis’ ‘social imaginaries’ – and in my
estimation seems an important corollary to intellectual history. Le Goff writes:
The histoire des mentalités operates at the level of the everyday
automatisms of behavior. Its object is that which escapes historical
individuals because it reveals the impersonal content of their thought:
that which is common to Caesar and his most junior legionary, Saint
Louis and the peasant on his lands, Christopher Columbus and any one
of his sailors. The histoire des mentalités is to the history of ideas as the
history of material culture is to economic history. (‘Constructing the Past,’
169)
Given our framework, the histoire des mentalités is the idiographic aspect of a nomothetic
corollary: intellectual history or the history of ideas—that which escapes the nomos of
development, refinement and progress of ideas.
Using psychology, however, is not always the best means for historical
explanation. The use of psychology in history often commits the historiographic sin of
anachronism. It should be noted that the gesture of historical depth, or the admission
into the interior of historical spaces is a common trope, but a trope that is difficult to
convincingly fake. The necessary distinction is between emic and etic categories, those
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‘native’ to past cultures, rather than ‘imposed’ on them by the historian (FP, 109). We
have, on the one hand, an entire tradition of western thought that attempted to uncover
the inner workings of historical forces, whether that meant the corso and ricorso of
dominant civilizations, the Produktionsweise which conditioned social and political life,
or the drives of the Unbewusste. While these general categories can be applied as an
analytic, the explanation they provide is at the expense of the voices of historical
subjects. Each of these theorists, in their own way, posit a lack of transparency to these
historical laws, such that individual and collective alike facilitate their action while
unaware of their presence. In their daily lives, people have and continue to maintain
structures of power and privilege, acting in accordance with ‘laws’ that determine
behavior. In such a schema, the masses are victims of a dominant class that cynically
manipulates them by means of ‘false consciousness.’ The opacity of these laws to social
actors is taken as warrant to exclude the voices of the past in favor of the narrative of the
historian (a point which I will return to in chapter 3). The histoire des mentalités, instead,
is assured that individuals understood the limitations and possibilities imposed by
structures, whether institutional or mental, and so instead attempts to present the past in
its alterity.
From the perspective of the present moment, the reconstruction of the past poses
a set of epistemological issues. How we interpret the space between the past and the
present, as a bridge, or a gulf, will radically color our views of historical epistemology.
In his 1984 Aquinas Lecture at Marquette University, Paul Ricœur argues that the reality
of the historical past, as a problem, can be approached either by the similarity of the past
to the present or through the difference between the past and the present. In Ricœur’s
terms, history can be written under the sign of either the Same or the Other. Under the
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Same he places the “re-enactment” of the past, following Collingwood and historians
who study the past in its likeness to the present (RHP, 5). Under the Other, he discusses
the sense of the past’s remoteness from the present, the effect of strangeness that a
historical account can produce. If we view historiography through this binary, we can
accord space to another, more controversial theoretical expression of a historical
research agenda, namely, the histoire des mentalités.
It should be noted that the histoire des mentalités is not reducible to the agendas of
intellectual history. Roger Chartier points out that the histoire des mentalités “is that of
daily life and habits; it is what escapes the individual subjects of history because it
reveals the impersonal content of their thoughts” (IHSH, 22, emphasis mine). Lucien Febvre
wrote compellingly of the European obsession with Witchcraft, and, in doing so,
presented a vision of medieval Europe awash with complexities. History often overlooks
“revolutions of the intellect which occur noiselessly and which no historian takes the
trouble to record” (Febvre, 1973, p. 191). Similar to Bloch’s approach to agrarian history,
Febvre notes that this area of research suffers from proper documentary evidence. What
sort of witness would even be capable of taking the distance necessary in order to
present their contemporaries as a microcosm? The histoire des mentalités then faces a
problem similar to psychology, insofar as it requires the implicit to become explicit. The
use of indirect evidence in such circumstances is both warranted and necessary, as
contemporaries are unlikely to take notice of the impersonal content of their thought.
Chartier writes, “unlike economic or social historians, who reconstitute what was, the
historian of mentalités or ideas seeks not the real but the ways in which people
considered and transposed reality” (CH, 43). Rather than find such information in the

Guzzi 28

works of metaphysicians, which often contain individual elements of thought, the
historian of mentalités seeks this information in the collective, and in the material trace.
This does not mean, however, that the works of great thinkers are taboo for these
historians. For example, Febvre points out that Jean Bodin, known today for his social,
political and historical writings, was also the author of Traité de la démonomanie des
sorciers, “one of the most depressing works of the age… which had countless editions”
(Febvre, 1973, 189). From this we can gather that belief in witchcraft was not, as we
might think, mere superstition, as the brightest minds of the Europe were also
convinced of the existence of witches. Moreover, the example illustrates one method for
restoring the alterity to the past - defamiliarizing the familiar.
In The Royal Touch, Bloch traces the belief in the king’s ability to heal Scrofula, a
disease which no longer exists. In the course of his work, he discovers that individuals
had no illusions about the ability of the king to heal the disease, yet still for hundreds of
years thousands made pilgrimages in order to see the king and be touched by him. If
Bloch proposed the royal touch as an example of ideology, he would still be at pains to
explain why the tradition lasted so long. Instead, Bloch attempts to demonstrate that
people believed that the king did not have this power, and yet went to visit anyway.
This example of a study of mentality is infamous in that it demonstrates simultaneous
belief and incredulity, a combination that would appear to us as logically inconsistent,
yet nonetheless Bloch presents it without intervening or attempting to ‘correct’ the
collective sentiments of medieval Europeans.
Given the influence of Braudel on the research agendas of the Annales, many
chose to forgo historical accounts which focused exclusively on single events. Burke
writes, “radical social historians rejected narrative because they associated it with an
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over-emphasis on the great deeds of great men, with the importance of individuals in
history and especially the importance of political and military leaders being
overestimated at the expense of ordinary men – and women” (CH, 122). Indeed, we
could associate such historical methodologies with scholars like Sidney Hook, in his The
Hero in History. The rejection of narrative is a component of the ‘history of below’ –
histories which focus on the subaltern and the marginalized, or at least histories which
are cognizant of the complex interplay of historical structures and human agency.
Now that we have analyzed the justification and analytical object of the histoire
des mentalités, we will turn to methods for writing. In what remains of this section on
mentalités, I will analyze two methods: one serial and one synchronic. Histories which
fall under the serial method focus on repetitive occurrences and have a nonchronological, yet diachronic method of organization. The synchronic often focuses on a
single, aleatory transformation, controversies and discontinuities. Phillippe Ariès uses
serial methods to construct mentalités in his Western Attitudes Towards Death. He studies
cultural phenomena which seem to be governed by inertia rather than change. His
corresponding methodology must account for changes in what appears to be “achronic,” writing that “at certain moments, changes occur, usually slow and unnoticed
change, but sometimes, as today, more rapid and perceptible ones” (Ariès 1).
Ariès uses indirect evidence, literary evidence, documentary evidence and
material evidence; citations of Solzhenitsyn intermingle with John Chrysostom. A
striking example of Ariès’ use of indirect, material evidence is his analysis of the living
to the dead. People were once ambivalent towards where they would be buried and
where the dead were kept, as attested to by funeral archeology. Christianity is credited
with the development of concern over where remains were kept, first in the form of the
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desire to be buried close to martyrs and saints. Churches held remains, and so
overturned an ancient practice of burial extra urbem (Ariès 16). These developments
attest to the fact that individuals had less scruples about proximity to the dead in ancient
times. Ariès writes, “the fact that the dead had entered the church and its courtyard did
not prevent both from becoming public places” (Ariès 23). In these times, death was
collectivized, not faced individually, and cemeteries were public spaces where
businesses, sportsmen and entertainers operated, played and performed. Urban
cemeteries were a regular feature of European cities until the early modern period, “at
the end of the seventeenth century signs of intolerance began to appear, the fact remains
that for more than a thousand years people had been perfectly adapted to this
promiscuity between the living and the dead” (Ariès 25).
The transformation of death from a collective rite to an individual trial shifted
the entire register of what death, as a concept, meant to people. Developments such as
literary and artistic depictions of the bedchambers of the dying (Ariès, 33), the fear of
decomposition (Ariès 39), and individualization of burial plots and tombs (Ariès 46),
reflected a change in religious sensibility about the importance of individual
responsibility in the face of the last judgement (Ariès 31). Then, there is the development
of “eroticomacabre themes” between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, where
death was “increasingly thought of as a transgression” rife with irrational, violent and
sublime connotations. Concurrent with the eroticomacabre, is a transformation in the
sensibility of death
In the past death in bed was a solemn event, but also an event as banal as
seasonal holidays. People expected it, and when it occurred they follow
the rituals laid down by custom. But in the nineteenth century, a new
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passion stirred those present. Emotion shook them, they cried, prayed,
gesticulated… henceforth these activities were described as if they had
been invented for the first time, spontaneously, inspired by a passionate
sorrow which is unique among sorrows. (Ariès 59)
In the 17th century, people developed an intolerance for the collective presence of the
dead in cities, in the 18th century, people developed an intolerance for the separation
implied by death, the permanent break of familial and kinship bonds.
My interest here is not to reproduce Ariès’ study, but rather the way in which it
demonstrates a radical shift in the sense of a concept. While the content of death has
changed little, if at all, the mentality surrounding death has radically changed, to what
Ariès calls forbidden death, the denial of death, or the attempt to hide it from others,
especially children. Death is no longer a collective rite, but is rather “a technical
phenomenon… a decision of the doctor and the hospital team” (Ariès, 88). The technical
event is also free from ritual practices like mourning periods. If it were not for funeral
and wake services, there would be little connection with death as experienced in the
previous millennia.
Reflecting on Ariès’ study, it seems important to note that there is little
continuity between the stages, and certainly no overarching rationale which could
account for why the changes occur in the way that they did. We are left with the
impression of the contingency of each development: religious sensibilities encouraged
collective burial sites, urban cemeteries encouraged a new intolerance for death, the
alliance of “eroticism in order to express the break with the established order,” and
finally, the shame and secrecy of death in contemporary treatment (Ariès, 105). Ariès’
study is one of the few among the Annales which attempts to incorporate historical
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information from the recent present. The scale of Ariès’ study, which examines change
over the long term enables him to fit recent developments into his work.
What of works on mentalités that are organized synchronically rather than
diachronically? The paradigmatic example is Le Goff’s essay Merchant’s Time and
Church’s Time in the Middle Ages. Within the essay, Le Goff uses both material and textual
evidence in order to develop historical facts on the controversy between two senses of
time in the Middle Ages. The present moment of writing serves as the final aspect of Le
Goff’s comparison, in that the idea of time as connected to space and as a functional
measure of human activity is still known to us today, whose development was
materialized in the development of communal clocks for cities governed by trade (TWC,
35). However, the archaic eschatological sense of time, which connects the minutiae of
daily life to the eternity of God’s kingdom, is alien to our sense. Le Goff’s conceit is that
these senses of time are not mutually exclusive, but were transformed by both
intellectual/moral controversies and material practices.
Within this schema, each sense of time corresponded to an ethics, and from this
basis one can claim that merchant and church time were at odds. Primarily, this
controversy concerned the practice of usury, and so concerned the basis of all economic
activity in the form of profit over time or credit. Le Goff’s essay does not contain an
exaggerated sense of importance of intellectual developments. He does note, however,
the importance of Hellenistic philosophy in revitalizing a sense of the contingency of
time in scholasticism (TWC, 40). This does not mean that Christians ceased to believe in
God’s dominion over time – however, it does indicate that the sense of this idea
transformed from the traditional conception that time is God’s and cannot be sold. In
order to chart this conjuncture, Le Goff relies on a wide range of indirect evidence from
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industrial and commercial documents to works of theologians in order to develop his
historical facts.
What is Le Goff’s object of analysis? He argues that his analysis does not concern
“an abstract collective individual,” but rather “men in the West between the twelfth and
fifteenth centuries who were in possession of sufficient cultural and mental equipment
to reflect on professional problems and their social, moral and religious consequences”
(TWC, 29). The gulf between Durkheim’s collective representations and Le Goff’s
concern is apparent. However, some proximity to ethnography is suggested due to the
lack of first or second person testimony. The voice of the historian is predominant, and
the essay takes the form of exploring the equipment without the interruption of those
who utilized it.
It is clear that the essay documents a change in the predominant collective
understanding of time. The essay does not, however, proceed through causal
explanation characteristic of accounts of historical change. Le Goff indicates that his
intent is to “stimulate a more intensive study of a history which raises numerous
problems”; this aim is evidently expressed by the lack of an indicated ultimate cause for
the transformation (TWC, 41). Why did the Church capitulate? Roughly periodized and
disconnected intellectual and economic trends are catalogued, but there are no pivotal
events to speak of. The virtue of the essay is the presentation of realms of possibility
within either mentality. Where a functional use of time allowed the merchant to engage
in compartmentalization, the earlier views of the church were inflexible and would
eventually yield to myriad developments.
If each work of history contains an implicit philosophy of history, what can be
said of Le Goff’s work, or of the histoire des mentalités in general? Here, the dynamics of
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historical explanation are of unique importance. The essay keenly demonstrates the
transformation between church and merchant time as the product of both human agency
and intellectual reflection on practice. The capitulation of the church is not presented in
irreversible terms: the overall change is described as a shifted “equilibrium” (TWC, 40).
There are two merits to this form of non-narrative explanation: first, there is no implicit
teleology – the claim that merchants both understood and lived time both piously and
functionally eliminates a secularizing narrative. Second, historical structures are shown
to be responsive to large-scale changes in industry and human agency. The manner in
which homo faber is shown to be the result of reflection on changes in practice attests to
the use of the essay as a supplement to intellectual history. Presented in this manner,
intellectuals are not mistakenly shown to be the primary agents of historical
transformation, as is often the case in the history of philosophy or intellectual history in
general, but rather practical and intellectual developments are shown to work in concert.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have analyzed several research agendas of the Annales
historians, developing a sense for the myriad trajectories which give the school its
infamy. I have suggested that these trajectories should not be read at face value, but as
attempts to expand the practice of history beyond sequesters resultant from changes in
the 20th century French academy. These trajectories included both large scale, macro
historical accounts and small scale micro historical accounts, as well as the pursuit of
new historical inquires such as agrarian history or the histoire des mentalités, and problem
based historical inquiry. These works required methodological innovations. These
innovations divorced historiography from artificial organization imposed by either
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archives or chronology and developed techniques for analyzing indirect and material
evidence.
In the subsequent chapters, I analyze two responses to the Annales trajectories.
First, I analyze Foucault’s historical-programmatic writings, in the Order of Discourse and
the Archeology of Knowledge. Next, I analyze some works of Rancière, especially the
Names of History and the analysis of a poetics of knowledge. I propose the following
stark difference in the reception of historiographic theory in French theory: the first
generally accepts programmatic statements, whereas the latter seeks to undercut or
undermine them in favor of an approach with more fidelity to the source material than
programmatic concerns.
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Chapter 2: Michel Foucault’s Archeological Historiography
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In the second and third chapter, we shift the orbit of our discussion toward what
is known as “French theory,” the “polyphonic, coolly critical, obscure, seductive and
crafty” works of European intellectuals that, as a feature of the American academy, have
become an alternative canon in their own right (Cusset, 277).
As we have seen, in the previous chapter, the Annales historians defended their
work from an impoverished documentary positivism. These apologetics in turn
influenced the auto critical writing in the work of several French theorists. Within
Foucault’s work, methodological reflection is used as an occasion to offer “retrospective
coherence” to his earlier texts (OEC, 58). However, we are concerned here with how
Foucault’s Archaeology of Knowledge purports to demonstrate the shared concerns
between the Annales historians and philosophers of the history of science and literature.
In doing so, Foucault attempts to combine the speculative reflection characteristic of
philosophy and the documentary analysis of archival researchers. In The Archaeology of
Knowledge, the meta-language characteristic of disciplinary apologetics is mobilized for
auto-critical purposes. However, many scholars consider The Archaeology of Knowledge to
be a methodological dead end.4 How far from the historical concerns of the Annales are
Foucault’s theoretical contributions to historiography?
The introduction to The Archaeology of Knowledge begins with a consideration of
recent advances in historical analyses of literature and science as well as the Annales
historians. In his analysis, Foucault differentiates between “traditional histories,” which
he associates with motifs of total history – chronologically organized series of political

See Dreyfus, Hubert L., Paul Rabinow, and Michel Foucault. "The Methodological Failure of
Archaeology." Michel Foucault, beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. Chicago: U of Chicago,
1983, 79-103.
4
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and social events that attempt to exhaust their object (AK, 3). He distinguishes these
motifs with emergent characteristics of both Annales historians and philosophers who
study the history of literature and science, such as Bachelard, Canguilhem and
Althusser. Foucault “maintained that the opposition between historians concerned with
stable structures and historians of literature and science, who emphasize the
discontinuous, was but a ‘surface effect’ of a more fundamental accord” (Bernauer, 101).
Reporting on this accord, however, does not mean that Foucault shares an outlook with
all Annales historians. More substantive analysis is required to establish Foucault’s
relation to these parties.
David Carroll, in “The Times of History and the Orders of Discourse” from The
Subject in Question, presents the views of Foucault and the Annales school as aligned. He
claims that both Braudel and Foucault are interested in “complicat[ing] the form of
temporality usually projected onto history” (Carroll, 123). As a result, “the Order and
the Time which History was thought to provide are thus replaced by the orders and
times of various and conflicting histories and discursive practices” (Carroll, 123).
Carroll’s analysis merges the vocabulary of Foucault and the Annales, presenting both as
a challenge to a hegemonic total History. Yet, it should be noted that a more complex
analysis is possible, which would account for the differences between Annalistes, their
research agendas and methodologies.
Carroll’s analysis of the Archaeology of Knowledge accepts the antagonism between
traditional history and the ‘new history’ as reason enough to claim that Foucault and
Braudel are in accord. Here, we should analyze Foucault’s claim of an accord between
historians of science and literature and the Annales, and in our reception, move beyond
this shared antagonism to traditional history. In this chapter, we will analyze the
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methodological criteria found in the Archaeology of Knowledge, the discrepancy between
Foucault and the Annalistes over the concepts of series and event, and develop an
account of how Foucault’s method contributes to the historiographical problem of
teleology. First, we must develop a sense for Foucault’s concepts which are developed in
The Archaeology of Knowledge.
The Archaeology of Knowledge is a multi-tiered methodological work. In it,
Foucault advances his own criteria and abandons episteme as an organizing
methodological concept. Instead, Foucault introduces an alternative method, that of
Archaeology, which he claims “is the analysis of discourse in its archival form” (AME,
289). Not a reconstructive method, as this archive is defined as “the accumulated
existence of discourses,” and is, therefore, a presentist treatment of historical materials
(AME, 289). By calling the approach a presentism, I mean to signal the anachronism
built into the method. Here, I follow Hartog’s definition: presentism is “the sense that
only the present exists, a present characterized at once by the tyranny of the instant and
by the treadmill of the unending now” (Hartog, xv). As Michael Roth writes, Foucault’s
“History of the Present” is an “antihistory attempting to make the present into a past
which we leave rather than into a history which we tightly embrace as our own” (Roth,
44). However, this does not mean that the historian uses the present as a means for
representing the past. Foucault criticizes Michelet for using this sort of reconstructive
technique.5 In order to produce this effect, the archaeological method takes a distance
from familiar categories of historical analysis.

In The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault writes: “By means of an illusion widespread in the nineteenth
century, and one to which Michelet gave the dimensions of a myth, history painted the end of the
Ancien Régime in the colours of the last years of the Middle Ages, confusing the upheavals of the
Renaissance with the struggles of the Enlightenment” (BC, 125).
5
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The problems presented by historicity, in the hermeneutic sense, are not of
concern here, as Foucault analyses the ‘enunciative function’ of ‘statements’ and their
‘positionality,’ all without reference to a speaker. The problems inherent in historical
criticism, observation, and judgment are sidestepped for a neutralizing descriptivism.
As Ricœur states, “Foucault has delimited a radially neutral terrain, or rather a costly
neutralized one, that of statements without a speaker” (MHF, 202). The philosophically
informed archivist of Foucault’s Archaeology of Knowledge, inspired by the shortcomings
or subjectivism in intellectual history, settles for a new method of rigorous,
programmatic description.
The section Archaeology and the History of Ideas, contains a term for term
opposition between traditional history and Foucault’s Archaeological method. Here, the
notions of archive, positivity and discursive formation are placed within the domain of
statements, enunciative field, and discursive practices, generally (AK, 135). Foucault’s
concept of archive takes into account material evidence, as well as documentary
evidence, so much so that he claims that all documents are considered “monuments” in
the historical practices of the Annales (AK, 7). Where Bloch defined the object of history
as men, Foucault claims that the archaeology of the human sciences shows “man is an
invention of recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end” (HC, 27 ; OT, 387). It could
be argued that Bloch’s regressive method, found especially in French Rural History, is a
kind of archeological analysis. Like Foucault’s Archaeology of Knowledge, French Rural
History proceeds backwards from available evidence, the former constructing a method,
the latter reconstructing the remote past.
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The main differences between the two approaches follow from the differences in
scale. In his methodological prelude, Bloch informs us of the danger of granular
analysis:
Factual data capable of definitive interpretation are to be expected only
from a field of research prudently tailored to a topographical setting. But
this scale is too small to allow the major questions to be posed. For that
we need wider perspectives, where there is no danger of losing sight of
the main promontories among a confused mass of accidental detail. (FRH,
xxiv)
This appeal to wider perspectives entails a search for the continuities general enough to
be relevant across the centuries. Foucault’s work, however, is well known for contributing
to a micro-physics of power, which he states is “diffuse, rarely formulated in continuous,
systematic discourse; it is often made up of bits and pieces; it implements a disparate set
of tools or methods (DP, 26). Foucault’s distance from the human subject allows for this
transformation of scale, from the longue durée to the microphysics of power. This
transformation of scale, however, did not develop in a vacuum, and, as we will see, entails
a calculated break from Annales historiography.
Period, Series and Event
By now, we see that there is a complex relation between Annales historiography
and Foucault’s archaeology, for several reasons. First, as evinced in the first chapter,
Annales historiography is not ‘of a piece’ – there are discrepancies between individual
historians, there are multiple incompatible methods, many research agendas. Foucault’s
archaeology is very distant from the anthropological and humanistic commitments of
some Annalistes, finding proximity instead to the serial methods developed by Braudel,
and the Chaunus. Of this serial method, Foucault has much to say. Our concern in this

Guzzi 42

chapter are two elements of Foucault’s archaeological method: the first, in his
assessment of serial history, the concepts of series and event, second, the analytic
separation between discourse and practice, specifically the implications this separation
has for historiography, teleology and human agency.
Much of Foucault’s explicit commentary on contemporary historiography
concerned the relationship of events to series.6 As seen in the first chapter of this thesis,
Braudel developed a theory of temporal stratification in an attempt to move
historiography beyond listing political and social events in chronological succession.
Foucault takes issue with Braudel’s approach, which can be read as restricting events to
a single temporal plane, defined by their short duration. Foucault, in aligning his
method of discontinuity with serial history, argues for a constructivist approach to the
development of historical facts.
Foucault establishes his view of the relationship between event and series
succinctly in the interview “On the Ways of Writing History” (1967):
Every periodization carves out in history a certain level of events, and
conversely, each layer of events calls for its own periodization. This is a
set of delicate problems, since, depending on the level that one selects,
one will have to delimit different periodizations, and, depending on the
periodization one provides, one will reach different levels. In this way
one arrives at the complex methodology of discontinuity. (AME, 281)
In elaborating the methodology of discontinuity, Foucault echoes Braudel’s theory of
temporal stratification. Foucault argues that traditional histories are focused on
documentary criticism, and attempt to fit documents into an already existing structure –

I am indebted to the discussion of Foucault and the Annales found in Dean, Mitchell. Critical and
Effective Histories: Foucault's Methods and Historical Sociology. London: Routledge, 1994, (p. 38) for
making the importance of this commentary apparent.
6
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the chronology of events and the succession of political organizations. With the new
history, traditional documentary analysis is replaced, and instead historians
Ha[ve] taken as [their] primary task, not the interpretation of the
document, nor the attempt to decide whether it is telling the truth or
what is its expressive value, but to work on it from within and to develop
it: history now organizes the document, divides it up, distributes it,
orders it, arranges it in levels, establishes series, distinguishes between
what is relevant and what is not, discovers elements, defines unites,
describes relations. (AK, 6)
All this to say that historians use documents in a different way. Historians do not find
facts, they create them by organizing more basic elements. In terms of facts, the logic of
discovery is superseded by the logic of constructivism. Here, events and series are
described in a relationship of dependence, each contingent on the other. So far, Foucault
does seem to be in an accord with the Annales, in regards to the construction of historical
facts, distinct layers of temporality, and by attesting to the intervention of the historian
into her material. As Martin Kusch claims in Foucault’s Strata and Fields, both Foucault
and the Annales share the conviction that traditional historical accounts “took for
granted the existence of certain ‘natural’ series,” the greatest of which is chronology
(Kusch, 42).
This accord, however, is undermined by Foucault’s account of series and events.
The relationship of event and series is an important occasion in Foucault’s reflection on
historical methodology in that it provides an explicit repudiation of Braudel’s
understanding of events in his theory of temporal stratification. While both thinkers,
then, oppose their own method to ‘traditional history,’ we see that behind this shared
antagonism lies a discrepancy. Foucault’s understanding of event and series does not
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rely on chronology as an external measure, as Braudel’s theory of temporal stratification
does. Where Braudel argues that events take place only at the third level of temporal
stratification, Foucault argues that events take place at multiple strata. This relation
between event and series is treated at length in The Discourse on Language, where
Foucault’s distance from Braudel becomes clear.
In The Discourse on Language, Foucault states:
We frequently credit contemporary history with having removed the
individual event from its privileged position and with having revealed
the more enduring structures of history. That is so. I am not sure,
however, that historians have been working in this direction alone. Or,
rather, I do not think one can oppose the identification of the individual
event to the analysis of long term trends quite so neatly. On the contrary,
it seems to me that it is in squeezing the individual event, in directing the
resolving power of historical analysis onto official price-lists (mercuriales),
title deeds, parish registers, to harbor archives analyzed year by year and
week by week, that we gradually perceive — beyond battles, decisions,
dynasties and assemblies — the emergence of those massive phenomena
of secular or multi-secular importance. History, as it is practiced today,
does not turn its back on events; on the contrary, it is continually
enlarging the field of events, constantly discovering new layers — more
superficial as well as more profound — incessantly isolating new
ensembles — events, numerous, dense and interchangeable or rare and
decisive: from daily price fluctuations to secular inflations. (AK, 230)
Where Braudel argued against histories comprised of events, specifically political events
such as wars, revolutions or transfers of power, Foucault presents an expanded sense of
events in order to demonstrate the manner in which Annales historians have
reinvigorated the primacy of events in historiography. While Braudel held trends and
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events in analytic tension, Foucault argues that the attention to trends instead offers
relief to events which would otherwise not be discernable. He continues:
What is significant is that history does not consider an event without
defining the series to which it belongs, without specifying the method of
analysis used, without seeking out the regularity of phenomena and the
probable limits of their occurrence, without inquiring about variations,
inflexions and the slope of the curve, without desiring to know the
conditions on which these depend. History has long since abandoned its
attempts to understand events in terms of cause and effect in the formless
unity of some great evolutionary process, whether vaguely homogeneous
or rigidly hierarchized. It did not do this in order to seek out structures
anterior to, alien or hostile to the event. It was rather in order to establish
those diverse converging, and sometimes divergent, but never
autonomous series that enable us to circumscribe the ‘locus’ of an event,
the limits to its fluidity and the conditions of its emergence. (AK, 230)
Where series once emerged in chronology as a secondary effect, series are now the
primary construction of historians. The construction of new series provides a “locus” for
events, a relief which provides sense to events as referents. Indeed, the construction of
series is described as a primary task of historians in The Archaeology of Knowledge.
Foucault claims that the historian’s task is “to define the elements proper to each series,
to fix its boundaries, to reveal its own specific type of relations, to formulate its laws,
and, beyond this, to describe the relations between different series, thus constituting
series of series, or ‘tables’…” (AK, 8). As the result of a historian’s judgment, a range of
facts are given an artificial limit. The relations that exist between series also create a new
problem for ‘total’ histories, as series may not converge or culminate. The level of
generalizability necessary for a total history cannot be made with the elements of a serial
history, as, at some point, series are not relative to each other, given that they are
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comprised of heterogeneous elements. For example, demographic trends do not directly
correlate to economic trends, as each trend is comprised of distinct units. Nor are series
in the history of climate, such as rainfall averages, relative to events in the history of
prison and ransom. Such series could all be part of the same history, if it were organized
geographically, however.
Foucault argues that both events and the series to which they belong are
produced by historians, that neither are given. Implicitly, he seems to suggest that
Braudel and similar thinkers maintain the ‘event’ as a natural unit defined by a short
duration, confined to a single temporal strata. There is much in Braudel’s writing which
suggests as much. In The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Phillip II,
Braudel claims that “events are the ephemera of history; they pass across its stage like
fire-flies, hardly glimpsed before they settle back into dark and as often as not into
oblivion” (MW, 901).
In Foucault’s estimation, events do not pre-exist historical writing in some grand
chronological movement of time, nor do they comprise a natural unit.7 Foucault clearly
attests to these implications in an interview, where he states that “serial history does not
focus on general objects that have been constituted beforehand, such as feudalism or
industrial development; serial history defines its object on the basis of an ensemble of
documents at its disposal” (AME, 426-7). Braudel, in a similar vein, argues that there is
creative space allotted by documentary evidence, but places this on par with the
historian’s intervention or judgment: “one could say that any event which forms a link
in a chain can be considered significant. But even ‘serial’ history is the result of a

Here Foucault’s proximity to Reinhardt Koselleck’s view in “Representation, Structure, Event”
is worth noting.
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selection, made either by the historian or for him by available documentary evidence”
(MW, 902). It would be misleading to suggest that Braudel totally breaks with the idea
that events have some value prior to their inclusion in a series, whether this value is in
terms of importance, consequence, or duration. In other words, where Foucault is
comfortable detaching history from chronology, Braudel does not abandon chronology
as a means of organizing events.
Causality, Agency and Determinism in Historical Explanation
In The Discourse on Language, Foucault states:
What is significant is that history does not consider an event without
defining the series to which it belongs, without specifying the method of
analysis used, without seeking out the regularity of phenomena and the
probable limits of their occurrence, without inquiring about variations,
inflexions and the slope of the curve, without desiring to know the conditions
on which these depend. (AK (my emphasis), 230)
Foucault’s claims here have complex etiological implications worth exploring. Without
chronology or causality, how could transitions be explained? Foucault argues that there
are logical alternatives to cause and effect:
As soon as relations of a logical type, like implication, exclusion,
transformation are introduced in historical analysis, it is obvious that
causality disappears. But we have to rid ourselves of the prejudice that
history without causality would no longer be history. (RC, 92)
Foucault appeals to logical criteria, to be preferred over causality by historians. Relations
established by the historian occur between documents, or, in other words, is a product
made at the moment of writing. Foucault states, “using this method, the historian can
reveal events that would not have appeared in any other way” (AME, 427). Within
traditional history, the significant events were given, not discovered. The historian’s task
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required that causes were ascribed to these events in order to elucidate, among other
things, their meaning. Foucault takes issue with chronology, in that it naturalizes
synchronicity, making it needless to explain synchronic events. He claims “we consider
the understanding of the way one event succeeds another as a specifically historical
issue, and yet we do not consider as an historical issue one which is in fact equally so:
understanding how two events can be contemporaneous” (RC, 92). Here, however, it is
not the cause which is hidden and the event which is visible. Rather, it is events which
are hidden. In another interview, Foucault claims:
Serial history makes it possible to bring out different layers of events as it
were, some being visible, even immediately knowable by the
contemporaries, and then, beneath these events that form the froth of
history, so to speak, there are other events that are invisible,
imperceptible for the contemporaries, and are of completely different
form. (AME, 427-8)
Foucault introduces an important caveat: an indifference to whether or not individuals
understood the significance of these events as they occurred. We can conclude then, that
Foucault’s account does not pivot on whether or not a historian uniquely attests to the
importance of a historical event. This is part and parcel of our next topic, Foucault’s
indifference to the classical categories of subjectivity: experience, agency and intention.
Foucault’s analysis also offers insight into his rejection of subjective
considerations, like experience. In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault states that
archaeology “does not try to restore what has been thought, wished, aimed at,
experienced, desired by men in the very moment at which they expressed it in
discourse” (AK, 139). In this double disavowal, Foucault distances the archeological
method from historical reconstruction in general, and the histoire des mentalités
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specifically. Given our analysis in the previous chapter, we discerned that a theme of the
histoire des mentalités was to reconstruct the limiting concepts of thought within a certain
epoch. This attention to the limiting structures which condition the possibilities of
human action within a certain time span seems very similar to Foucault’s concept of
episteme. Archaeology takes a distance from both episteme and mentalités, in Foucault’s
rejection of both reconstruction (and attendant issues like chronology, anachronism,
cause and effect) and subjectivity. Foucault claims that archaeology “is nothing more
than a rewriting: that is, in the preserved form of exteriority, a regulated transformation
of what has already been written. It is not a return to the innermost secret of the origin; it
is the systematic description of a discourse-object” (AK, 140).
While Foucault’s assessment of series and event explains his distance from
chronological and etiological concerns, why the disdain for the categories of
subjectivity? Why would mentalités not factor into “the systematic description of a
discourse-object”?
In his commentary in I, Pierre Rivière: A Case of Parricide in the 19th Century,
Foucault analyzes two events by first troubling their sequence. In the section “Text and
Murder” he writes, “In Rivière’s behavior memoir and murder were not ranged simply
in chronological sequence – crime and then narrative. The text does not relate directly to
the deed; a whole web of relations is woven between the one and the other; they support
one another and carry one another in ever-changing relations” (IP, 201). While
Foucault’s commentary is not specifically deemed an ‘archaeological account,’ there
seem to be enough relevant similarities in Foucault’s treatment of the lettres de cachet
found in the Annales d’hygiène publique et de medicine légale (Rocha, 193). Foucault
indicates the discontinuities between Rivière’s confession and his act – and, in doing so
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assigns to them distinct agencies in the present moment. As Rivière had spent time and
care deliberating on the murder, so much so that he considered his confession prior to
the act, the text was “drafted in his head beforehand” (IP, 202). It is due to this curious
displacement of the confession prior to the act that the text is considered by Foucault to
be a factor in the murder, an equivalence between “weapon” and “discourse” (IP, 203).
Rather than merging the act and the confession into a whole, like a judge or a journalist
interested in using reconstruction to establish motive or intent, the analytic separation of
these two successive events is possible only if neither are fully subsumed into each
other.
The above case, in refusing a reconstruction of the intention of Rivière, instead
describing the text and the act as two distinct and competing functions, demonstrates for
us a complex interplay which does not reach closure in a cause and effect sequence.
Here, experience is misleading in that it reduces two ‘strata’ into a single event. As
Foucault argues, the narrative has a unique role in making “the transition from the
familiar to the remarkable, the everyday to the historical” (IP, 204). The narrative is a
crucial element in enlarging the event beyond the scope of the everyday and into
historical importance. The relationship between the narrative and the event is one of a
transformation of scale, not simply one of chronological succession. Further, Foucault
adds that
the ambiguous existence of these sheets undoubtedly masks the processes
of a subterranean battle which continued in the aftermath of the
Revolutionary struggles and the Empire’s wars around two rights,
perhaps less heterogeneous than they seem at first sight – the right to kill
and be killed and the right to speak and narrate. (IP, 207)
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Foucault’s remarks place Rivière’s crime into an unusual, if not typically invisible, series,
remarking on the proximity between “the ‘curious’ news items, the ‘extraordinary’ facts,
and the great events and personages of history” (IP, 205).
We have in the example of Pierre Rivière an instance where the subjective
categories of experience, intention, and motive are rejected in order to hold the closure
of several events at a distance. This is not the only place where Foucault argues that
experience can be historiographically misleading. In an interview, Foucault offers an
illuminating example:
The fact that Europe’s demographic curve, which was pretty much
stationary in the course of the eighteenth century, rose abruptly at the
end of the eighteenth century and continued to rise in the nineteenth is, in
part, what made possible the industrial development of Europe in the
nineteenth century, but no one experience this event in the way that one
might have lived through the revolutions of 1848. (AME, 428)
Here, Foucault’s point hinges on the fact that experience may be misleading. Certainly
contemporaries often misjudge or mistake the importance of events, or events fall
beyond their perception in ways that archival research can recover. Also, Foucault’s
archaeological method attempts to replace, term for term, problematic elements of the
history of ideas, which often uses subjective categories, such as influence, in order to
describe the transmission of information between subjects. Such language, from the
standpoint of systematic description, attributes mental capacity to history itself.
Let’s analyze the problem of anthropomorphic history. In the section Change and
Transformations, Foucault criticizes two models of history which offers more insight into
his rejection of the categories of subjectivity. He claims that history has been presented
in “the model of the stream of consciousness whose presence always eludes itself in its
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openness to the future and its retention of the past” (AK, 169). Two concerns are present
here. First, there is the problem of presenting intellectual transmission as synchronic:
one thinker ‘influences’ another – despite the fact that they were not contemporaries
and, in the final analysis, thought in different ways. Next, there is the “retention of the
past” found in etiological description, progressive succession, Aufhebung. Here,
chronological order (or, in Foucault’s terms, “the thread of an original calendar”) implies
the retention of the past, even in absence of some vector of material transmission or
preservation (AK, 169). Ultimately, anthropomorphic characterizations of history found
in the history of ideas either insert teleological agency into historical explanation, or
cover over discontinuities. Foucault claims that
Anyone envisaging the analysis of discourse solely in terms of temporal
continuity would inevitably be led to approach and analyze it like the
internal transformation of an individual consciousness. Which would
lead to his erecting a great collective consciousness as the scene of events.
(PK, 69)
Foucault instead suggests that concepts like influence do not describe change, but are
forgotten metaphors or substitutes for adequate explanations of change and
transformation. He claims that “discourse… is not a consciousness that embodies its
project in the external form of language; it is not a language, plus a subject to speak it. It
is a practice that has its own forms of sequence and succession” (AK, 169). We will
return to the point that discourse has unique forms of transformation, but first it is
important to evaluate the account of agential change found in the Archeology.
Could Foucault, in his early writings, be accused of diminishing the force of
agentic power? Insofar as the agentic possibilities require relay through the
archeologist’s description, it does appear that this is the case. For example, Foucault
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writes that “the description of the archive deploys its possibilities” granting a sort of
revitalizing power to description (AK, 131). Further, this power is described as that of
ruptures and breaks, it “deprives us of our continuities; it dissipates the temporal
identity… it breaks the thread of transcendental teleologies… bursts open the other, and
the outside” (AK, 131). In each case, the ‘deployment of possibilities’ seems to result in
the same negative agency, an aleatory eruption resulting from the description of the
archive. In this sense, the question of agency is evaded insofar as the locus of concern
remains the archive’s meaning for the present, and not a reconstruction of past events.
Put otherwise, Foucault’s ‘method of discontinuity’ seems to reduce the complex
varieties of agential change to a single model of disruption.
What use is the method of discontinuity for describing change if it abandons the
logic of cause and effect? Foucault’s works typically do not contain the causal closure
which is demanded from historical accounts. Changes appear, the magnitude of which is
attested to, but seldom are reasons offered for these changes. We have seen that
Foucault’s archaeological method lacks etiology in two respects: first, in terms of
chronological succession, and second, in terms of subjectivity, experience, and human
agency. While, as in the case of Pierre Rivière, this opens up the space for alternative
explanations, it is not clear that the method of discontinuity is a preferable
historiographical method. In fact, the rejection of these two forms of etiology only
corresponds to problems that are found within the description of knowledge – a revised
history of ideas. However, discontinuity in historical writing has important applications
to the problem of teleology in historiography.
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Teleology in Historiography
The dependence of events on series promotes general, rather than total histories,
eliminating the issue of teleological extra-historical forces, like providence, from
historical accounts. Foucault’s introduction to The Archaeology of Knowledge reports the
movement away from theories which posit a single unity, like total histories, from those
which accept a multiplicity of singularities, like general histories. Of total histories,
Foucault writes that
the project of a total history is one that seeks to reconstitute the overall
form of a civilization, the principle – material or spiritual- of a society, the
significance common to all the phenomena of a period, the law that
accounts for their cohesion – what is called metaphorically the ‘face’ of a
period. (AK, 9)
Total history is contrasted with general history, of which Foucault writes: “The task of a
general history is to determine what form of relation may be legitimately described
between these different series; what vertical system they are capable of forming…” (AK, 10,
my emphasis). Here, Foucault attributes possible form to the vertical relations of a general
history, indicating that these general histories are largely destabilizing with regard to
vertical hierarchies. I argue that this specific attribute is in response to Braudel’s theory
of temporal stratification, which assigns a “clear hierarchy of explanation” not to each
stratum, but all stratums as a whole (Appleby et al, 308).
Foucault clearly promotes general history over total history, however, it is
unclear how proponents of general histories would cease to make the same sort of
claims to epistemic truth that total histories are charged with. The scale is clearly a point
of distinction; however, this distinction only makes sense insofar as total histories
continue to circulate. In this way, Foucault’s advocacy for general history consists of a
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deeply relativizing gesture meant to ward off truth claims. In The Need for Theory in
History, Koselleck observes that “all metahistorical categories will change into historical
statements” (PCH, 3). In the case of general versus total history, the latter’s metahistorical
claims are just as historical as the former’s, despite appearances or claims to the
contrary. While the dispersive effect of general histories might contradict the unifying
effects of total histories, this is due to the fact that the former replaces the latter.
Discontinuity in history does not, however, eliminate the possibility of
teleological readings of historical events. To borrow an example from the French
historian Roger Chartier, we can consider the fact that all ‘events’ organized in relation
to the French revolution risk being read as necessary developments spurred on by the
progress of enlightenment reason. By this I mean to indicate that the general theme
which is used to organize events runs the risk of providing an exhaustive explanation
for them, presenting the outcome as an inevitable consequence of contingent events.
Is the discontinuous method a substitute for teleological historiographic
accounts? Foucault admits as much. He writes that “rupture is the name given to
transformations that bear on the general rules of one or several discursive formations.
Thus the French Revolution – since up to now all archaeological analyses have been
centered on it – does not play the role of an event exterior to discourse, whose divisive
effect one is under some kind of obligation to discover in all discourses” (AK, 177).
Here, repetition wearing down the term ‘discourse’ risks obscuring the specificity of
Foucault’s point. The French Revolution is not exterior to discourse; Jacobin ideology
competes with other discourses at the time. Concepts like the ‘enlightenment’ risk
coloring our reading of this period, making political or, of special interest to Foucault,
clinical developments seem irreversible. However, writing histories of the period known
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as the French Revolution without specific mention of the name is disorienting. While it
makes retrospective sense to think of The History of Madness, The Birth of the Clinic and
The Order of Things, as counter-histories of the French Revolution, and the Enlightenment
more generally, such a realization takes place at a level of generalization beyond the
subject matter of any of these texts.
Viewed historiographically, these archaeological works tend towards nomothetic
description. A passage from Gilles Deleuze’s Foucault reads:
But if it is true that the conditions are no more general or constant than
the conditioned element, it is none the less the conditions that interest
Foucault. This is why he calls his work historical research and not the
work of a historian. He does not write a histoire des mentalités but the
conditions governing everything that has a mental existence, namely
statements and the system of language. He does not write a history of
behavior but of the conditions governing everything that has a visible
existence, namely a system of light. He does not write a history of
institutions but of the conditions governing their integration of different
relations between forces, at the limits of a social field. He does not write a
history of private life but of the conditions governing the way in which
the relation to oneself constitutes a private life. He does not write a
history of subjects but of processes of subjectivation, governed by the
foldings operating in the ontological as much as the social field. (Deleuze,
116)
Deleuze observes that Foucault’s histories are not descriptions of events as they
transpired (or, in other terms, his works are not reconstructive). Foucault’s histories
describe elements in terms of conditions, rules, and laws. What archaeological analyses
purport to show, then, are a set of rules or laws detached from their speakers and
situations. In examples, Foucault lends these rules or laws troubling proscriptive agency:
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It is not possible for us to describe our own archive, since it is from within
these rules that we speak, since it is that which gives to what we can say –
and to itself, the object of our discourse – its modes of appearance, its
forms of existence and coexistence, its system of accumulation, historicity,
and disappearance. (AK, 130)
The archaeologist, while promising a novel methodology, denounces the idea that the
insight gained thereby is enough to be used as leverage against constraints and
conditioning rules. The archaeologist is described as bound within an inexhaustible
archive whose possibilities exceeds the archaeologist’s descriptive abilities. While such a
situation may make descriptive sense retrospectively, that is, from a third standpoint
which is beyond both the archive and the archivist, it makes little sense to adopt this as a
description of the self-same subject conducting the archaeologist analysis. As in many
other examples found in Foucault’s work, the powerlessness of the archaeologist in the
face of the archive-as-law remains unconvincing due to the manner that creative human
agency is evacuated. The inertia which the archeologist faces indicates that archaeology
shares similitude with the history of ideas far more than with history proper. While the
Archeology of Knowledge depends on the methodological and terminological innovations
of the Annales historians, it does not thereby become a full-fledged theory of history.
Does it make retrospective sense to describe researchers as constrained by the
limits of their documentary evidence – their archive? Yes, but such a position would
need to rely on the principles of historical reconstruction, which would in turn entail
some hermeneutic depth in regards to the status of the past. What is the past in
retrospection? Is it a projection of memory coupled with a projection of the present into
a future scenario, as some thinkers such as Heidegger, Gadamer and Koselleck suggest?
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I argue that Foucault’s view is divergent from the aforementioned for two
reasons. First, Foucault’s account does not utilize mnemotechnic categories, as it does
not hinge on an “anthropology,” as is found, for example, in the work of Koselleck:
The categories ‘experience’ and ‘expectation’ claim a higher, or perhaps
the highest, degree of generality, but they also claim an indispensable
application. Here they resemble, as historical categories, those of time and
space. (FP, 257)
In contrast, Foucauldian statements have unmediated spatial and temporal
consequences, for example:
A total description draws all phenomena around a single centre – a
principle, a meaning, a spirit, a world-view, an overall shape; a general
history, on the contrary, would deploy the space of a dispersion. (AK, 10)
Here, agency has no anthropological mediation, and the categories of time and space do
not undergo an anthropocentric re-rendering.
Second, Foucault repeatedly denounces the trope of past-as-origin, which is best
expressed by Leibniz, who claimed the study of history allows access to “the origins of
things present which are to be found in things past; for a reality is never better
understood than through its causes” (quoted in HC, 35). Instead, Foucault often refers to
the past as a terminus in its own right, by highlighting the myriad discontinuous aspects
of the past. Of great difficulty would be the attempt to reconstruct, from the set of rules
and laws which make up the archaeology of a discourse, the basic units, elements and
specific features of that discourse, without making these separate entities appear the
same. As we have seen from his disavowal of the histoire des mentalités, Foucault has a
great distrust of reconstructive methods.
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This distrust is not confined to The Archaeology of Knowledge, but is also found in
other works. For example, in Lives of Infamous Men, Foucault states that:
All those lives destined to pass beneath any discourse and disappear
without ever having been told were able to leave traces – brief, incisive,
often enigmatic- only at the point of their instantaneousness contact with
power. So that is doubtless impossible to ever grasp them again in
themselves, as they might have been ‘in a free state’; they can no longer
be separated out from the declamations, the tactical biases, the obligatory
lies that power games and power relations presuppose. (EWF, 6)
Here it does appear that Foucault claims there is access to non-discursive elements of the
past in traces. Such an admission is crucial for the description of transformation and
change, which requires more than the succession or co-existence of limits described in
terms of rules and laws. However, as demonstrated in the above quote, Foucault
considers these lives to be inseparable from their constraints. Roger Chartier advocates
for the analytic separation of practices from discursive practices in The Chimera of the
Origin: Archaeology of Knowledge, Cultural History, and the French Revolution. He writes:
Recognizing that access to such non-discursive practices is possible only
by deciphering the texts that describe them, prescribe them, prohibit
them, and so on does not in itself imply equating the logic that
commands them or the ‘rationality’ that informs them with the practices
governing the production of discourse. (OEC, 59)
Chartier offers an example wherein the formal element of practice is retained through a
discontinuity in discursive practice. His example is from a work of Alexis de
Tocqueville, The Old Régime and the French Revolution, focusing on the transition between
the aristocracy and the Jacobins. De Tocqueville’s thesis supports Chartier’s idea of “the
Enlightenment as a sheaf of practices without discourse – in any event, of practices
irreducible to the ideological affirmations intended to justify them” (OEC, 60). Here, the
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practices of the centralized power completed the revolutionary education of the masses.
De Tocqueville argues that “the government itself had long worked to make several
ideas, since called revolutionary, enter and become fixed in the minds of the masses,
ideas hostile to the individual, contrary to private rights, and friendly to violence” (de
Tocqueville, 230). De Tocqueville argues that Louis XV taught the masses that “there is
nothing so old that it must be respected, nor so new that it may not be tried” (de
Tocqueville, 230). When the government sought to create roads, it “did not make any
difficulty about taking all the land it needed for its projects, and knocking down all the
houses that got in its way” (de Tocqueville, 231). By doing so, de Tocqueville argues that
the government taught future revolutionaries “the little regard which individual rights
merited when public interest required that they be violated, a doctrine which [they] took
care not to forget when the time came to apply it to others” (de Tocqueville, 232). Here,
it makes little sense to suggest that either revolutionary ideology was a clean break from
the practices of the Ancien Régime, or that the Ancien Régime is totally continuous with
the revolutionary government. Instead, a discontinuity in ideology is coupled with a
continuity in practice. A complex example, to be sure, but one which affirms Foucault’s
concern with rigorous attention to the particularities of historical transformations, one of
the many types of “discontinuities” to which Foucault attests (HDD, 231). Tocqueville’s
writings support Chartier’s thesis in this section alone. It should be noted that the
teleology of enlightenment reason is supported in a subsequent section, which is titled
“How the Revolution Came Naturally from What Preceded it” (de Tocqueville, 241, my
emphasis).
In Foucault’s commentary on the Annales historians, we can see a deep
seriousness assigned to the methodological statements of historians, which he sees as an
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aspect of the “methodological renewal of history in general” (‘Live’, 47). Given
Foucault’s interest in rules, laws, or, in my terms, the nomothetic aspects of
historiography, it makes sense that so much of his intervention in the field of history
concerns problems of method. So much so, that Foucault uncovered hidden implications
in the methodological statements of Braudel and Chaunu, criticized and altered the
understanding of the twin concepts of series and event. More radically, when thinking
of knowledge in terms of law or condition, Foucault demonstrated “that there is no need
to pass through the subject, through man as subject, in order to analyze the history of
knowledge” (‘Live’, 49). In other words, through the two problems of history as a stage
of consciousness, and the juridical apparatus surrounding problems of intent and
motive, Foucault diagnosed an issue pertinent to historiography, which is best
conceptualized in terms of teleological agency. While Foucault’s method of discontinuity
does advance us toward a solution to teleology in historical writing, he does so at the
expense of both individual and collective subjects, whose creative agency, caught in an
entanglement of laws, rules and other noetic constraints remains unclear. If we follow
Chartier in understanding the influence of these rules which govern discursive systems
as non-causal, then we still only have half of a dialogue, so to speak.
It could be said that my treatment of Foucault has focused on his attention to
methodological claims, and in doing so, has failed to develop a more apt comparison.
Perhaps it is the case that Foucault’s methodological statements are not mirrors of his
historical scholarship. How would Foucault’s treatment of a historical event compare to
a member of the Annales? Luckily, there are some events which are treated by both. For
example, there is Foucault’s piece The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century, which is
comparable to Braudel’s “The Eighteenth Century: Watershed of Biological Regimes” in
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Capitalism and Material Life. I found this example fitting, as both Foucault and Braudel’s
concept of ‘event’ privileges those sorts of transformations which are difficult for
contemporaries to detect. The European 18th century is just such an occasion, as we will
see through the course of this analysis.
Braudel heralds the 18th century as the end of a brutally restrictive Ancien Régime,
during which death and life were kept in a precarious balance. Reflecting on
demographic statistics, he writes that “only in the eighteenth century did births gain
over deaths, and this was to be the pattern regularly thereafter” (CML, 73). This
triumph, however, is quickly tempered by its tragic pedigree, the history of famine and
epidemic. He writes:
These then are the facts that go to make up the biological Ancien Régime
we are discussing: a number of deaths roughly equivalent to the number
of births; very high infant mortality, famine; chronic under-nourishment;
and formidable epidemics. These pressures hardly relaxed even with the
advances made in the eighteenth century, and then at different rates in
different places of course. Only a certain section of Europe, and not even
all of Western Europe, began to break free of them. (CML, 91)
Braudel’s tempered optimism entails that the 18th century marks a conjuncture, a
medium term transformation of a number of structural constants. It seems important to
note, however, that Braudel’s explanation of the 18th century is a retrospective
comparison. While the section endeavors to explain the 18th century, Braudel does so by
reference to the period of 1400 to 1800. Hence, his analysis is meant to establish causal
connections between remote times and places.
Given what we know of Foucault’s estimation of causal explanations, his analysis
of the 18th century ought to be remarkably different. Indeed, The Politics of Health in the
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Eighteenth Century opens by disparaging the effectiveness of a causal explanation of the
period:
No doubt it is scarcely fruitful to look for a relation of anteriority or dependence
between the two terms of a private, ‘liberal’ medicine subject to the
mechanisms of individual initiative and laws of the market, and a
medical politics drawing support from structures of power and
concerning itself with the health of a collectivity. (PK, 166. Emphasis
added)
Instead of a de facto casual analysis, Foucault frames the transition as de jure. He claims
that here “is the emergence of the health and physical well-being of the population in
general as one of the essential objectives of political power. Here it is not a matter of
offering support to a particularly fragile, troubled and troublesome margin of the
population, but of how to raise the level of health of the social body as a whole” (PK,
170). Foucault sees the transformation as a consolidation of power, and the end of
informal means of care.
In this essay, we can observe a curious reversal of Braudel’s claims. Where
Braudel was confident to ascribe a number of technological, scientific and agrarian
factors to the population increase, Foucault instead frames the issue in reverse order. He
writes that “the sudden importance assumed by medicine… arguably concerns the
economico-political effects of the accumulation of men” (PK, 171). Foucault offers the
term noso-politics to describe this new form of knowledge, wherein
the biological traits of a population become relevant factors for economic
management, and it becomes necessary to organize around them an
apparatus which will ensure not only their subjection but the constant
increase of their utility. (PK, 172)
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Between Foucault and Braudel, which is the relevant development of the 18th century? Is
it the increase in population, or the intent to develop around this population an
economic apparatus to manage disease? If we attempt to mediate this conflict, we might
find recourse to distinct historiographic principles useful. Where Braudel’s intents are
largely rationalist, Foucault’s commitments are more obscure. A pertinent difference lies
in Braudel’s liberal use of what might be considered anachronistic terminology. For
example, Foucault hastens to inform his readers that institutional developments mirror
conceptual ones, where he writes that “the emergence of ‘population’ [and] its biomedical variables of longevity and health” are products of 18th century institutions (PK,
177).
In a sense, this divergence stems from more than just distinct historiographic
commitments, but entails political differences as well. Our reading of Braudel and
Foucault, therefore, leads us to a juncture wherein we must apply our historiographic
question: is history the study of people, or should such inquiry cede to the
“antihumanist reading” of history (Cronin, 211)? Braudel, while he disparages the
“overfed rich,” lists “regular invasions… not purely by beggars… but by positive armies
of the poor” among the perennial dangers of the period (CML, 73;75). Yet can Foucault’s
work, an unflattering ventriloquism of alarmists and reactionaries, really be said to have
greater political currency? In my assessment, neither historian offers a preferable
politics, unless we are willing to risk the notion that there is no gap between history as
product of the intelligentsia, and organized political resistance.
However, my appeal to this gap is temporary, as it is the subject of the next
chapter. Our analysis of the works of Foucault has left some unanswered questions.
What are we to make of the political claims of historians? Further, if we reject Foucault’s
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antihumanist historiography, can we write histories of individuals without falling to the
Scylla of a subject-centered historical account, rife with the rip-tides of providence,
teleology and progress, or the Charybdis of structuralist inertia? It is possible to write a
history wherein the programmatic concerns of the historian do not override either the
evidence of her sources, à la Foucault, nor the diachronic dynamism of the source
material, à la Braudel?
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Chapter 3: Jacques Rancière: Politics, Poetics and the People in Historical Reconstruction
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The previous chapter discussed how Foucault, one of the protagonists of French
Theory, draws from but also distinguishes himself from the Annales Historians,
introducing specific questions, both methodological and philosophical, relevant for
historiography and methodologies of history. In this chapter, we shift our focus to
another French theorist, Jacques Rancière. Here we are concerned with Rancière’s
theoretical contributions to historiography, with special attention to those which follow
from the course of our previous analysis. First, a word about Rancière’s oeuvre. His
historical works include The Names of History, Le concept d’anachronisme et la vérité de
l’historien, Nights of Labor and La Parole Ouvrière, co-authored with the historian Alain
Faure. This chapter focuses on The Names of History, especially those sections which
concern the Annales School. Rancière’s dual criticism focuses on the political acumen of
the Annalistes through a close analysis of the textual strategies contained within select
histories. So far our analysis has suffered from a lack of attention on politics, partly due
to the focus on thinkers such as Foucault, who failed to formally attend to the political
stakes of historical writing, at least in the works treated in this thesis. With our analysis
of Rancière’s Names of History, we return the problem encountered at the end of the
previous chapter, the gap between histories as material product and political struggle.
Where an empirical assessment of this problem may resolve in the postulate that
histories represent political struggles, Rancière’s detour through the concept of mimesis
leads to a non-mimetic theory of poetics wherein political representation and political
credential can be squared. I conclude that Rancière contributes to our understanding of
the politics of historiography through his criticism of ‘history from below.’ However, it
is also the case that some problems raised by Rancière’s historiography, such as those of
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place, as well as the role of the historian, are also characteristic problems of the positivist
historiography we explored in the first chapter.
Discussion of Rancière’s pertinent critiques will require some prior engagement
with Rancière’s political works. Political critiques of historiography found in these texts
bear traces of Rancière’s ‘axiom of equality’ which states that “the same intelligence is at
work in all the acts of the human spirit” (IS 18). Put otherwise, “people generally
understand what they are doing and don’t need someone else to think for them”
(Kritzman, 642). In matters of politics and philosophy, the consequences of this axiom
seem straightforward and desirable. But what about matters of historiography? Much
contemporary historiographical theory figures the historian as a sort of mediator
between the reader and the voices of the past. At a glance, this axiom of equality seems
to threaten the dominant mode in which history is written. Instead of studying the past
through indirect testimony relayed by a historian, how would it be possible to have a
history that upholds the idea that people generally understand what they are doing? The
retrospective coherence and insight offered by historians into past events, transitions
and long-term structures would be abandoned in favor of auto-ethnographic accounts.
On the one hand, such a demand seems close to the histoire des mentalités studied in the
first chapter. On the other hand, a competition between the historian’s voice and the
voice of her subject calls into question the political currency of the history from below.8

In this chapter, I use the phrase ‘history from below’ as a catch-all term for social, cultural and
political histories that take as their primary subject subaltern, marginalized and impoverished
individuals or groups. The phrase ‘history from below’ comes from Lucien Febvre, and was
popularized by E.P. Thompson in a 1966 review of the same name.
8
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Old and New
First, we must orient ourselves to Rancière’s theoretical work on historiography. In The
Names of History, Rancière focuses on the Annales historians for the first two chapters.
His concern is twofold, first, a comparison between the poetics of the ‘old’ and ‘new
history’ – analyzing the language of Braudel’s Mediterranean, with the aim of separating
the voices of the past from the historian’s ventriloquism. Here, Rancière cuts to the heart
of the political stakes of ‘the history from below,’ developing a critique of
historiographic representation of impoverished classes and marginalized voices. Known
to scholars as the ‘history from below,’ this genre of historical writing focuses on
ordinary people, rather than the subjects of traditional history. The early Annales
historians, such as Febvre and Bloch, pioneered the “histoire vue d’en bas” in areas such as
rural history and the history of popular belief (Febvre, 1932, p. 576).
First, Rancière reports of the break between the “old tradition of chronicling”
and the new history endowed with “the rigor of a science” (NH, 1). Rancière conceives
of this break as an attempt by the new historians of the Annales to give a new rigor to the
old equivocations and indeterminacies of traditional historical accounts. As we
analyzed in our first chapter, the Annales historians did attempt to build new
foundations for history; these included research agendas, methodological criticism and
interdisciplinary inquires. Some of these research agendas entailed a break with what
we might call literary aspects of historiography, what Foucault opposed with
discontinuity. Insofar as the ‘new history,’ variously advocated for problem-centered
approaches to history, these historians distanced their own accounts from a literary
procedure that had been disguised as an unassailable principle of historiography:
chronology. In Rancière’s terms, the Annales situated themselves beyond the homonymy
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which indexes “lived experience, its faithful narrative, its lying fiction and its
knowledgeable explanation all by the same name” (NH, 3). Henceforth, the Annales
would transform history into a reinvigorated science, but, as Rancière claims: “the
difference between history as science and history as narrative was necessarily produced
in the heart of narrative, with the latter’s words and use of words” (NH, 3). Rancière
introduces an important distinction between history as a science and history as
narrative. Through the course of our analysis, we have encountered philosophers,
historians and theorists who would place themselves on either side of this division. In a
Kantian vein, Rancière proposes that the literary functions of history undergird and
support the possibility of this distinction, insofar as it is the case that this distinction is
directly supported by the adoption of an alternative set of vocabulary, writing
conventions and styles. Scientific history, dissatisfied with the indeterminacy involved
in narrative, sought to use the conventions of the social sciences to validate historical
inquiry, as attested to in the works of Annales historians such as Emmanuel Le Roy
Ladurie, François Furet and the Chaunus. Much of Rancière’s historiographic criticism
focuses on the manner in which history requires indeterminacy, whether this means
borrowing literary conventions developed in fictional works, or relying on testimony
whose factual content is in question.
Rancière’s guiding question in the beginning of The Names of History could be
restated as: What purpose does the ‘old history’ serve for the inauguration of the ‘new
history’? While the new history appears to abandon the conventions of the old history, it
ought to be noted that in its various guises ‘traditional history’ or ‘old history’ is a
retrospective term at best. While the Annales agendas variously break with older
conventions, this break is not complete, as evinced by the historians to which Annalistes
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pointed as their precursors. Rancière presses even further into this debt, indicating that
the new objects and methods of the Annales intermix with the objects and methods of the
old history, namely, great historical figures, great historical events and the literary
conventions of historiography. In order to analyze how the Annales managed this
transition, Rancière proposes “a study of the set of literary procedures by which a
discourse escapes literature, gives itself the status of a science, and signifies this status”
(NH 8). The first chapters of The Names of History are textual analyses of the Annales
historians, represented by Braudel’s Mediterranean. Perhaps Rancière intended to
criticize François Furet, who, before infamously announcing that the French Revolution
never took place, famously proposed that historians attempt to “define the specificity of
historical knowledge in relation to the social sciences in general” (Constructing the Past,
12). In other words, Furet argued that not only could history be practiced as a science,
but that historians ought to “give up being satisfied with the immense indeterminacy of
their knowledge” (quoted in Kritzman, 13). What is meant by knowledge here? Is it
ambiguity in the historian’s mind or in the historian’s object?
Let us further analyze the ambiguity of historical facts. Historians have methods
for removing ambiguity, but in order to do so, they must rely on the scientific
conventions of other disciplines. As seen in our first chapter, the nomothetic and
idiographic antimony developed around this disciplinary dilemma. The division
between singular fact and general law is, for Rancière, a matter of which discipline
histories lean on. He writes that histories are either
… a ‘factual’ history, clinging to what the poetic and rhetorical tradition
designates as characters and actions worthy of interest. Or, to escape this
tradition, it has to devote itself to the search for the laws of history, which
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are in fact that laws of other science: theology one upon a time, sociology
or economics in the modern era. (PL, 175)
Rancière introduces literature as the third term of this either/or. As stated in The Names
of History, story and history are both histoire in French. While modern histories, like
those exempla from the Annales, use conventions of sociology and economics in order to
give scientific legitimacy to these works, histories informed by literary conventions
“take on the risk of a certain intermin[acy]” (PL, 182). For example, Rancière points out
that “biography does not happen without a certain indistinguishability between reality
and fiction” (PL, 182). The locus of this interminacy, Rancière argues, is variable, as it
corresponds to the infinite complexity of human lives. He writes that individuals relate
their life to writing
… as a testimony to a certain relationship between life and writing. It also
means dealing with texts whose factual content is partly indeterminate.
The stories workers tell of embarking on writing are themselves
exemplary tales that refer to each other and repeat certain pre-existing
models. They tell of the meeting between life and writing, not in the
accuracy of the facts they relate, but in their very ‘falseness’: not in their
inaccuracy, but in the way they are borrowed and displaced, attesting to
the shifting of one mode of experience of language and life to another
mode. (PL, 182)
The final sentence attests to a motif in Rancière’s critical writings, the transition of
conventions from one field to another. This transitive principle is used to argue against
mono-casual and teleological versions of history. The fact that conventions are transitive
between genres, styles, social groups, etc. is important for understanding Rancière’s
position on the ‘old’ and ‘new’ history, and we will return to it in our discussion of
historia magistra vitae. For now, it is sufficient to state that Rancière attests to
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anachronistic appropriation as a kind of critical potential for revolutionary politics. For
example, in The Names of History, Rancière argues that the Roman historian Tacitus
… creates a model of subversive eloquence for the orators and simple
soldiers of the future. The latter will henceforth not repeat Percennius,
whose voice has been lost, but Tacitus, who states the reasons of all those
like Percennius better than they do. And when the language of Tacitus
has, as a dead language, taken on a new life, when it has become the
language of the other, the language whose appropriation procures a new
identity, the overly talented students in the schools and seminaries will
fashion, in their own language and in the direct style, new harangues; the
self-taught will in their turn take these as models, competing with the
evangelical narrative and the imprecation of the prophets. All those who
have no place to speak will take hold of these words and phrases, those
argumentations and maxims, subversively constituting a new body of
writing. (NH, 30)
Tacitus is an interesting example, as it is unclear what if any impact he had on his
contemporaries, whether politically or historiographically. His works were rediscovered
and given new importance both by Catholic dogmatists —as Tacitus contains one of the
few flattering contemporary accounts of Christ (Tacitus, xiv) — and Renaissance
thinkers, who turned to his work for his political insights (Tacitus famously argued
against constitutions of a mixed type). This example, like the use of the Roman term
proletarian by Blanqui shows an affinity between anachronism and radical political
transformation (NH, 93).
Politics, Poetics and the People
These aforementioned features of Rancière’s work: the incomplete transition
from the old to the new history, the homonymy which indexes the similitude between
literature and history, the allowance for ambiguity, and the transitivity of characteristic
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conventions are all unique demands that Rancière places on a ‘new’ historiography.
However, it is so far unclear how features of Rancière’s political thought influence his
historiographic thought. I propose to clarify this relationship with reference to two
works, the first of which is Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy. In this work, Rancière
positions “politics” and “equality” as antimonies, insofar as equality is represented to
people through the law (DPP, 61). Equality, therefore, is not a statement of affairs, but a
logic which can be used to analyze and declare its own absence (the norm and scandal)
from the state of affairs known as politics (or ‘the police’ in Rancière’s terminology).
Politics, within Rancière’s lexicon, indicates an “activity antagonistic to policing”
whereby those who have no part in the ‘police order’ find community in the injustice of
their exclusion.
How do we apply thoughts which orbit political philosophy to historiography?
Rancière states that “politics is always at work on the gap that makes equality consist
solely in the figure of the wrong” (DPP, 62). Hence, the problem of representation is
doubly involved in politics, insofar as “the gap” is the result of the continuing failure of
political representation; and insofar as equality finds sole representation in “the figure”
of those who are deprived by this failure. Rancière’s thoughts on political philosophy
find application to historiography also around these problems of representation. The
short essay “‘Le Social’: The Lost Tradition in French Labour History” focuses on the gap
between working class movements and social histories of mass movements. As Rancière
states, “it is not evident that working-class militants felt the need for their own history”
(PHST, 268). Rather, it seems to be a false assumption that the history of a movement is
primarily intended to be read by the proponents of those movements. This is another
version of the ‘dominant ideology thesis,’ which, when applied to historiography,
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results in the (common) thought that histories are written in order to provide insights
which escaped those individuals who are the subject of that history. Rancière’s political
maxim of the equality of speakers finds its application in decoupling social history as an
intellectual product from organized working-class movements. Historians, such as Le
Roy Ladurie, who were once members of the communist party, produced “static”
histories, which Rancière claims “succeeded in taking the place of historical materialism.
It produced an ideology… denying any real change from below” (PHST, 272). We find
the “politics” of historiography, not in similitude with the actions represented therein,
but rather, at a distance from this representation, and in the gap between these histories
and the movements with which they share a simulated acumen.
Now, we can continue with our reading of The Names of History. First, we will
analyze and assess Rancière’s analytic of poetics. Next, we will analyze Rancière’s
critique of the politics of historiography.
Roland Barthes’ The Discourse of History demonstrates a technique for the
rhetorical analysis of historiography. In the course of his analysis, Barthes demonstrates
that several techniques used in literature are also found in the work of classical
historians. The discourse analyst looks for “the shifters (in Jakobson’s sense of the term),
which assure the transition from the utterance to the act of uttering;” of which he
mentions two types (‘Comparative Criticism,’ 7). The first, listening, is signaled by
phrases “of the type as as I have heard, or to my knowledge” signaling the intervention of
the historian or author into the event reported. The second is a catch-all category for the
historian’s explicit signs of organization; “the second type of shifter comprises all the
explicit signs whereby the utterer – in this case, the historian – organizes his own
discourse, taking up the thread or modifying his approach in some way in the course of
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narration” (‘Comparative Criticism,’ 8). Barthes argues that in classical histories,
historians use these shifters for several reasons. They allow a historian to signal their
own voice and differentiate various aspects of temporal sequence; they lend contours to
narrative and allow historians to break from a totally linear sequence of events. Shifters
function to temporally align the reader with the historian. For example, Barthes writes
that
This type of discourse – though linear in its material form – when it is
face to face with historical time, undertakes the role of amplifying the
depth of that time. We become aware of what we might call a zig-zag or
saw-toothed history. A good example is Herodotus, who turns back to
the ancestors of a newcomer, and then returns to his point of departure to
proceed a little further – and then starts the whole process all over again
with the next newcomer. (‘Comparative Criticism,’ 9)
Readers understand turns back, proceed and return not in the spatial register, but in the
temporal register. These text effects are the same convention in literature or in history.
We should note that Barthes’ reflections are based on classical historical accounts, such
that his observations about the regularities of historical discourse may not apply if we
were to analyze the Annales historians.
Rancière’s analysis is indebted to Barthes’ focus on the use of shifters. In The
Names of History, he writes that in the new history,
The casting of the narrative in the present tense renders its powers of
assertion analogous to those of discourse. The event and its explanation,
the law and its illustration, are given in the same system of the present.
(NH, 14)
In other words, Rancière claims that within the new history, the old poetics of shifters
are abandoned, or, at least all occurrences are held to be synchronic. There are no
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linguistic indications of a temporal shift. As an example, he offers a passage from
Braudel’s Capitalism and Material Life 1400-1800:
‘There is another rule with no exceptions: epidemics jump from one
human mass to another. Alonso Montecuccoli, whom the Grand Duke of
Tuscany sends to England, ... will cross from Boulogne and not from
Calais, where the English plague ... has just arrived.’ The tense of the rule
is identical to the tense of the event. And this identity goes along with
another, that of the literal and the figurative: the ambassador who crosses
the Channel and the epidemic that jumps have the same modality of
existence. (NH, 15)
Within this passage, there is a noticeable lack of those shifters which Barthes indicated
are so central to expressing complex temporal relationships. From the standpoint of a
poetic analysis of the text, this new equivocation produces a novel kind of
indiscernibility than those found in ‘the old history.’ Rancière writes:
The new history aims to assure the primacy of things over words and to
circumscribe the possibilities of each time period. But this discernment of
the weight of things and the specificity of tenses can function only on the
basis of a poetical principle of indiscernibility. The true discourse on the
advance of the epidemics and the fictitious narrative of the meeting
between the king and the historian stem from the same syntax and the
same ontology. The literal and the figurative are seemingly indiscernible
here, and the present in which the king receives the historian responds to
the future past of the ambassador's voyage. (NH, 15)
In attempting to distance their accounts from the ‘old history’s’ focus on events, the
Annales historians did attempt to describe time periods in terms of their possibilities:
whether this meant describing structural material constraints or mentalités. Within this
subjunctive register, the historian ‘enters’ into the scene in the sense that there are no
explicit linguistic indications of a temporal division between the king and the historian.
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Hence, the old ambiguities of histoire resurface within the Annales, such that the
historian’s intervention becomes the historian’s testimony.
How does Braudel fare as a historical witness? Rancière playfully compares him
to a near contemporary of Phillipe – Thomas Hobbes. Rancière focuses on Hobbes’
accounts of the causes of sedition found in De cive and Leviathan. In Rancière’s account of
Hobbes, the words of the poor are given revolutionary agency, and are portrayed as an
object of fear, primarily in the form of sedition. Rancière remarks:
The theoretical and political evil, for Hobbes and the tradition he opens,
may be identified in this way: the proliferation of borrowed names, of
names that do not resemble any reality, and that kill because they are
poorly used, used by people who should not handle them, who have torn
from their context to apply them in a situation that has nothing to do with
their context. (NH, 21)
Like in his analysis of Tactius, Rancière emphasizes the revolutionary agency found in
appropriating names.9

Sylvain Lazarus, in L’anthropologie du nom, raises similar issues which concern the stakes of names
in the study of history. Lazarus indicates the importance of adding a third term to the objects and
subjects of history: the space of the name. In doing so, Lazarus reserves an agency in the loci of
names, similar to Rancière’s attestation of the agency of words (mots). In each, we find a space of
possibility between the objective and ossified categories which engulf unique events, and the
experience of those events. However, Lazarus proposes names as the basic unit of history, which
places him at odds with both Foucault and Rancière, who propose no basic units of history (Badiou,
2012, p. 87). An account of Lazarus’ L’anthropologie du nom can be found in Badiou’s Metapolitics
(2005, p. 27-55.) A careful assessment of Lazarus, including an analysis of Lazarus and Bloch on
the problem of Time and Politics (p. 19-26) can be found in Calcagno, A. (2007) “Abolishing Time
and History: Lazarus and the Possibility of Thinking Political Events Outside Time” Journal of
French Philosophy 17(2), 13-36. L’anthropologie du nom will be available in English translation in
September, 2015. It would be interesting to determine whether Lazarus’ concept of historical
sequence is like or unlike Rancière’s attestation to the appropriation of names à la his discussion of
Tacitus.
9
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While Braudel underplays the significance of the words of the poor, both
explicitly and by omission, the works of Hobbes prove that contemporaries feared the
multiplicity of voices, that they were active political agents. This sort of agency reaches
its height in declaring a new legitimate force in politics: “the same illusion, then, assigns
the body of the king an empty name (despot) and gives the multitude a name that fits
only the sovereign body, the name people” (NH, 20). The French Revolution
consolidates this inauguration of a new sovereign body, the people. However,
historiography represents this new sovereign body through abstract personification,
“the subject of history became an object, or rather, a place, among other places, for
objects of history” (NH, 95). Whether this abstract personification is the nation of France,
the Mediterranean Sea, or the not otherwise specified archive, the subject of the new
historiography, from Michelet to the Annales, becomes a place.
In Rancière’s terms, the subject-as-place places the new history at odds with the
modern revolution. He writes:
The modern revolution, whose birth Hobbes is witnessing, could be
defined as follows: the revolution of the children of the Book, of the poor
who are ‘eager to write, to talk of themselves and others,’ the
proliferation of speakers who are outside their place and outside the
truth, gathering the properties of the two great bodies of writing
lingering within their reach, prophetic epilepsy and mimetic
hydrophobia. It is a revolution of paperwork in which royal legitimacy
and the principle of political legitimacy find themselves defeated,
fragmented in the multiplication of speech and speakers who come to
enact another legitimacy – the fantastical legitimacy of a people that has
arisen between the lines of ancient history and of biblical writing. (NH,
20)
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Rancière’s description of the French Revolution is essentially a transfer of names from
ancient texts to modern groups. In terms of names, the transition takes place between
the “proper names of chronicling” to the “common names of science” (NH, 96). This a
way of discussing the French revolution as a ‘text effect,’ and the transfer of conventions
of ancient history (specifically names like proletarian, the wretched of the earth, etc.) and
prophetic, universalistic tone of oracular biblical writing found in documents like the
declaration of the rights of man, and the declaration of independence. This transition
reaches a dramatic height at the end of Braudel’s Mediterranean.
In Braudel’s Mediterranean, the death of king Philip II is written as a metonymy.
Rancière writes that “the displaced death of Philip II metaphorizes the death of a certain
type of history, that of events and kings. The theoretical event on which this book closes
is this: that the death of the king no longer constitutes an event. The death of the king
signifies that kings are dead as centers and forces of history” (NH, 11). But does the ‘new
history’ correspond with this political revolution? Certainly the ‘new history’ signals a
transition away from the old objects of history: kings and the political elite. But does the
‘new history’ also change the subject of history from the elites?
What role should people play in historiography? Some analysis of this problem
in the philosophy of history will help. At a glance, Rancière’s axiom of equality, which
asks us to posit that “the same intelligence is at work in all the acts of the human spirit”
has striking similarity to a principle from Vico which states that “verum et factum
convertuntur [the true and the factual are interchangeable].” With these remarks, Vico
influenced an entire lineage of Marxist historiography, insofar as the object of history
was thought to be human action. Georg Lukács, in History and Class Consciousness, writes
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Marx has recalled, in a quite different context, Vico’s remark to the effect
that ‘the history of man is to be distinguished from the history of nature
by the fact that we have made the one but not the other.’ … The object of
cognition can be known by us for the reason that, and to the degree in
which, it has been created by ourselves. (Lukács, 112)
In this Marxist lineage, homo faber boasts a unique intelligibility as a historical object.
Such declarations would make sense to Marc Bloch, who claimed that history was the
“science of men in time” (HC, 27). Indeed, an entire section of the Annales, inspired by
historians such as Michelet, would promote similar ideas through histories of mass
movements, peasant life, and rural history.
As discussed in the previous chapter, Foucault, in heralding the ‘death of man,’
considers “man” to be “a face dawn in sand at the edge of the sea” (OT, 387). While
there was a strong connection to more humanistic analysis among the Annales, it is
important to note that Foucault’s ideas did gain currency with some historians. For
example, Le Roy Ladurie writes against “anthropocentric prejudice” (Le Roy Ladurie,
17). Further, he states that “it is mutilating the historian to make him into no more than a
specialist of humanity” (Le Roy Ladurie, 20). Le Roy Ladurie, however, does not think
that history will completely abandon anthropocentric prejudice; the historian “can and
still most of the time will be Bloch’s charming anthropophagous ogre” (Le Roy Ladurie,
20). However, it should be noted that those historians who cling to Foucault’s antihumanism tend towards scientistic histories. In either case, the issue of the proper object
of historical analysis is still contested by historians, and tends to define disciplinary
affiliations.
We can separate the previous problem, people as a unique historical object, with
the problem of people as a unique historical subject. Foucault had many reasons, in the
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previous chapter, for dismissing a generalized human subject, as did the Annalistes
studying the histoire des mentalités in the first chapter. As it stands, these dissenting views
point out a lack of consensus among the Annales historians and the theorists inspired by
their work. We should note, however, that the latter problem as political currency,
unlike the former. Various movements such as Alltagsgeschichte, feminist history,
postcolonialism, and subaltern studies have stakes in the politics of historical
representation, insofar as they attempt to account for contributions made by people who
were ignored by earlier forms of historiography.10
Each contemporary historiographic movement from below disrupts the Ancien
Régime’s historico-didactic paradigm of historia magistra vitae. As Koselleck writes in
Futures Past, historia magistra vitae held that “history can instruct its contemporaries or
their descendants on how to become more prudent or relatively better, but only as long
as the given assumptions and conditions are fundamentally the same” (FP, 28). With
such a philosophy of history, the past was considered “a continuous space of potential
experience,” which could be used for didactic purposes (FP, 28). Here, the subject and
object of history coincided, with an elitist political register. Machiavelli’s Discourses open
by invoking the didactic function of history, stating that his commentary on Livy “will
comprise what I have arrived at by comparing ancient with modern events, and think
necessary for the better understanding of them, so that those who read what I have to
say may the more easily draw those practical lessons which one should seek to obtain
from the study of history” (Machiavelli, 206).

An example is Ranajit Guha’s ‘On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India,’ Subaltern
Studies I, Oxford University Press (New Delhi), 1981, wherein he writes that earlier historiographies
of India “fails to acknowledge, far less interpret, the contribution made by the people on their
own, that is, independently of the elite” (Guha, 2).
10
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Of course, histories of elite politics leave many gaps, as Brecht expressed in
Question From a Worker who Reads:
Who built Thebes of the 7 gates?
In the books you will read the names of kings.
Did the kings haul up the lumps of rock?
Within the 19th and 20th centuries, these gaps in knowledge were filled, partly in thanks
to the Annales. However, the new ‘history from below’ emphasizes the agency of the
historian over the agency of the historically represented. E.P. Thompson, in Making of
the English Working Class, wrote: “I am seeking to rescue the poor stockinger, the luddite
cropper, the ‘obsolete’ hand-loom weaver, the ‘utopian’ artisan, and even the deluded
followers of Joanna Southcott, from the enormous condescension of posterity” (‘English
Working Class’, 12). In the transition to the ‘history from below’ conventions from the
heroic individual paradigm are applied to the historian, resulting in a sort of
soteriological philosophy of history, whereby people from the past await the
intervention of the historian. The new ‘history from below’ represents an incomplete
transformation from the paradigm of the Ancien Régime, historia magistra vitae.
Rancière works with an alternative model of historical reconstruction. Here, it is
again necessary to turn to the works of Roland Barthes. In his Michelet, Barthes offers a
version of historical practice which seems to align with Rancière’s. Barthes writes:
For Michelet the historical mass is not a puzzle to reconstitute, it is a body
to embrace. The historian exists only to recognize a warmth… the roots of
historical truth are therefore the documents as voices, not as witnesses.
Michelet considers in tem, exclusively, that quality of having been an
attribute of life, the privileged object of which clings a kind of residual
memory of past bodies. Thus, the closer the document comes to a voice,
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the less it departs from the warmth which has produced it, and the more
it is the true foundation of historical credibility. (‘Michelet’, 81)
Instead of, like Furet, claiming that historians need to eliminate the ambiguity of their
source material, or, like Ginzberg, highlighting the connection between the judge and
the historian, who both interrogate and mediate, Rancière, in attempting to embrace the
“excess of words” seems to be advocating a position closer to auto-ethnography than
historiography (NH, 24). The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to this problem,
which can be identified as a competition between the historian and the voices of the
past.
In the Names of History, Rancière takes a unique stance on this problem by
developing a criticism of Braudel. The passage which incited Rancière reads as follows:
We must learn to distrust this history with its still burning passions, as it
was felt, described and lived by contemporaries whose lives were as short
and as short-sighted as ours. It has the dimensions of their anger, dreams
or illusions. In the sixteenth century, after the true Renaissance, came the
Renaissance of the poor, the humble, eager to write, to talk of themselves
and of others. This precious mass of paper distorts, filling up the lost
hours and assuming a false importance. The historian who takes a seat in
Philip II’s chair and reads his papers finds himself transported into a
strange one-dimensional world, a world of strong passions certainly,
blind like any other living world, our own included, and unconscious of
the deeper realities of history, of the running waters on which our frail
barks are tossed like cockleshells. (quoted in NH, 17)
In this methodological preface, Braudel expresses his distrust of those ‘eager to write,’
stating that this ‘precious mass of paper’ assumes a ‘false importance.’ Further, Braudel
ascribes to the poor an ignorance of their own position, a historiographical version of a
dominant ideology thesis. Armed with the tragic insight of posterity, Braudel asserts

Guzzi 85

that this world, like all others, is blind to circumstance. Clearly, he has in mind the
categories of the longue durée, which escape the notice of all individuals caught up within
them. However, it is important to note that this passage is not accompanied by sufficient
evidence to scientifically support Braudel’s claims. Rather, the passage takes the form of
a narrative. Rancière advances a criticism of Braudel couched in the language of Platonic
categories, the mythos of the poor against the logos of the historian.11 He notes:
What the historian here seems to propose to us, outside all determined
reference, is a fable that unites the literal and the figurative of the
amphibology: something like a Platonic muthos where the poor do not
represent any defined social category but rather an essential relation with
non-truth. (NH, 18)
Braudel argues that the ‘mass of paper,’ while ‘precious’ works as a sort of red herring.
However, Braudel’s methodological exposition is presented as a story, and so, Rancière
argues, the conventions of literature are used to back the legitimacy of history. All of the
aspects which are part of the historian’s judgement are left out of the narrative. It is also
interesting to note the manner in which Braudel describes the writing of the poor, as
eager speech.
The Archive’s Pulse
Rancière argues that the Annales do not portray words as active agents, when
contemporaries, such as Hobbes, feared them. Testimonial information does not enter
into a ‘history from below.’ Instead, Rancière portrays the Annales historian as a
mediator, stating that “to pass from the history of events to that of structures, one must

These are also Vico’s categories in the chapter entitled “poetic logic:” “The word logic comes
from Greek logos, which at first properly meant fable, or fabula in Latin, which later changed into
Italian favela, speech. In Greek, a fable was also called mythos, myth, from which is derived Latin
mutus, mute” (New Science, Section 401, p. 157). It is interesting to note that Vico’s discussion
claims that logos is dependent on narrative, which seems to be Rancière’s main conceit.
11
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separate the masses from their non-truth” (NH, 22). Hence, within Rancière’s criticism,
the poor and the masses are held in analytic tension. He writes that “the poor, in the
allegory of the science of historical study, represent the obverse of the ‘good’ object of
knowledge, the masses” (NH, 18).
The renaissance of the poor, which ought to be indicated by the new mass of
paper, is instead substituted for the Mediterranean. If we accept Rancière’s view, that
the nation, once represented by the land, is instead represented by the people, that the
Annales history regresses in portraying the Mediterranean as the main subject. (Hans
Kellner in Disorderly Conduct: Braudel’s Mediterranean Satire choses to read the work as a
satire for precisely these reasons.) The political and poetic elements of Rancière’s
criticism demonstrate that within Annales historiography, the masses are represented as
objects through scientific means like demography. This retrospective version of history
evacuates the critical potential found in the appropriation of names, in order to secure
the historian’s epistemic certainty.
Rancière’s rejoinder entails listening to the past as it is spoken - much like
Barthes’ version of Michelet. However, the revival of the voices of the past borders
between the two extremes of fiction and auto-ethnography. Ricœur observes:
This granting of speech is particularly ineluctable in the case of the ‘poor,’
the anonymous, even when grievances, records lend support. The
substituted discoursed is basically antimimetic; it does not exist, it
produces the hidden: it says what these others might say. (MHF, 342)
While, in Rancière’s view, Braudel’s historiography of the poor is bound to a number of
Platonic categories bound to mimetic representation, the “anti-mimetic” history is
relegated to the subjunctive register. History as if, not history as it was.
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Rancière’s Nights of Labor, with the exception of the preface, contains a
Benevistian separation between discourse and self-attestation. The narration takes the
third person: “His name is Armand Hennequin, aged twenty-seven; born in Belgium of
a French father, the chief customs collector there” (NL, 137). Self-attestation, primarily
found in the use of “I” phrases, is found only in quoted excerpts of worker’s writings, as
in “I have already told you: I no longer have faith in time. I no longer believe in its
organic missions. My existence is too twisted by its subversions” (NL, 232).
There is a subjunctive reconstruction of the past present; “In this month of
September 1841” (3). There is also the use of shifters within discourse to produce the
‘zigzag or sawtooth’ effect to which Barthes did attest:
When a caste of masters was not making him spend time in prison,
individual masters employing him would assure him earnings of 2,000 to
2,400 francs a year and readily entrust the management of their
workshops to a man who cast such a spell on their workers. In the last
prison he would enter, which the government of the bourgeois caste would
let him leave only as a dying man, he would again ask his wife to send
him “the illustrated Gospels my boss gave me as a present that fortnight
when I went to so much trouble for his big order. That privileged
relationship certainly put him in the best position to lead the battle for the
recognition of those workers without anything to offer in the struggle
except the risk of combat itself. (NL, 43)
Further, the use of first person pronouns is restricted to quotes from the archived
materials. In this sense, the ‘subject’ of the work remains the workers. Largely, the
historian fades into the background.
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At this point, a number of similarities between positivist historiography and
Rancière’s revisionist historiography are apparent. First, there is the recourse to the
subjunctive, found in Seignobos’ La méthode historique appliquée aux sciences sociales:
The condition for understanding a social fact is that one represent to
oneself the man or group of men who are its author; and that one be able
to link it to a psychological state, very vaguely defined, perhaps, but
sufficiently known to allow us to understand it – the motive for the act.
(quoted in NH, p108n)
Where the Annales developed an entire theoretical apparatus devoted to studying
feelings, sentiments and interior states, committed as they were against the anachronism
of positivistic historiography, the reconstruction of motive relies on a subjunctive space,
an as if terrain in which to play out the past scene in question. Put another way, where
the problem of historical place is given fresh reconsideration by the Annales, such that
they virtually abandon the “non-place” found in the old histories, Rancière, by
promoting this “non-place” as the privileged site of the marginalized and the voiceless,
inherits the conceptual baggage which the specification of place sought to avoid
outright.
Second, and more importantly, there is the positivistic distain for the historian’s
intervention or entrance to the scene of events. Rancière’s solution, as outlined in this
chapter, is to lend the historian’s voice to those who were previously visible, but mute.
What then, of the historian? Ought the historian to become invisible, as the discussion of
Braudel’s interlope on Phillippe II might suggest? It seems important to note here that
the issue encountered in Foucault’s Archeology of Knowledge concerning the place of the
archaeologist is also present in Rancière’s Names of History.
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While Foucault’s Archeology did not directly address the political stakes of
historiography, Rancière’s Names of History does offer us two forms of political closure.
First, his critique of the ‘history from below’ current informs us of the gap between
histories as intellectual products, and those represented through those histories. Second,
his anti-mimetic theory of poetics promises to secure the voice of the past in writing,
which found application in Nights of Labor. From these two points, it follows that the
political currency of historiography may be challenged by squaring the gap between a
history as a material product and those whom it represents. Unlike Foucault’s
Archaeology, Rancière’s criticisms do seem to allow for application. However, it is
troubling that both accounts fail to offer an account of the historian which is neither a
methodological regression nor an oversight.
By way of a conclusion, let’s take note that Rancière offers us none. The
interlaced discussion, which has offered us insight into poetics and discourse analysis,
politics and historiography, concludes with what many other theorists of history have
noticed: that the past remains open. Open to interrogation, open to appropriation,
inconclusive and indeterminate. No science or archeology is bound to radically
transform that circumstance. Historiography, however, continues to amass insights in its
transformations, methodological digressions and regressions. Our second order
reflections on the ‘third level’ here draw to a close, without the aid of a fitting metaphor
or didactic supplement.
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Conclusion
The first chapter was largely expository, insofar as it attempted to establish a
number of conceptual, factual and historical bases necessary to acquaint the reader with
my subject of research. Through an analysis of the conflict of the faculties, we found that
the Annales historians were engaged in a reinvigoration of historical study, and did so
by way of political and methodological justifications for their work. These historians
decried the positivism, nationalism and documentary fidelity of previous historical
approaches in order to develop a myriad of research agendas that stressed the
importance of the historian’s intervention, used methods of social sciences, and sought
explanation of phenomena previously ignored in history. For the purpose of our
analysis, it was important to have this account in order to assess some aspects of
Foucault and Rancière’s work which could be considered methodological regressions to
positivism. Primarily, the problem of the place of the historian is resolved by neither
thinker.
Within the first chapter, we first raised the issue of the “event,” which raised two
interrelated problems. The Annales historians first found issue with events as the ‘emic
unit’ of historical study, the result of an unspoken consensus of earlier historians. Their
problematization of the event was radicalized in the work of Foucault, who arguably
attempted to raise discursive statements to the level of an emic unit of his archaeological
method. As we have seen, the issue at stake is the question of duration in the
construction of historical works, and whether the duration unit ought to correspond to
the faculties of human perception. Braudel’s longue durée, Rancière’s mot and Foucault’s
énoncé each vie to establish a new elementary unit of historical study. As I am myself of
the conviction that there are no basic units of historical study, it would be interesting to
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explore these issues in a seminar setting. For this purpose, I have included a model
syllabus as an appendix [See appendix A].
Opposite to the problem of the basic unit of historical study is the old problem of
philosophy of history regarding the status of laws. The Annales historians use of
mentalités assailed the previously unassailable law of historical writing, chronology. The
analysis of church time and merchant time in the middle ages, found in Jacques Le
Goff’s Time, Work and Culture in the Middle Ages (29-42), is an especially pertinent
example. There are also the achronological studies of Braudel.
Foucault issued a radical challenge to the use of cause and effect, which ought to
be considered the other unassailable law of historical writing. Roger Chartier’s On the
Edge of the Cliff (esp. 57-60), treated in the second chapter of my thesis, contains the most
well thought exposition of the matter I encountered in my readings, and his conclusion
is worthy of reproduction:
Thinking of the Enlightenment as a sheaf of practices without discourse
(or outside discourse)--- in any event, of practices irreducible to the
ideological affirmations intended to justify them—is perhaps the surest
way to avoid teleological readings of the French eighteenth century
(which are more persistent than one might think) that view if from the
standpoint of its necessary end point, the Revolution, and retain in it only
what led to that supposedly necessary outcome: the Enlightenment.
(OEC, 60)
While we found the evidence to support Chartier’s claim that De Tocqueville’s The Old
Regime and the Revolution is an example of such a non-teleological reading impartial at
best, it is clear that the sections of Braudel’s Civilization and Capitalism analyzed in the
second chapter suffer from teleological tailoring. However, it is unclear if Foucault’s The
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Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century is a preferable alternative, in that it merely
reverses the two elements found in a cause and effect relationship in other scholarship.
A sub-analysis of this problem is at work in The Names of History, where Rancière
repurposes Michelet. I would restate this problem as whether or not people can be said
to be retrospectively bound to structures and trends. Rancière clearly advocates for a
sort of historical reconstruction which preserves the agency of the past, rather than
merely protecting the past from condescension à la E.P. Thompson. Within Rancière’s
work, this issue is bound to the difference between text and voice, an issue familiar to
students of philosophy from Plato to Derrida. Rancière’s position is better stated by
Barthes, who said
The closer the document comes to a voice, the less it departs from the
warmth which has produced it, and the more it is the true foundation of
historical credibility. (‘Michelet’, 81)
Where historical credibility was once founded on documentary criticism,
Michelet sought to restore historical credibility back to vie. Where the legacy of
Michelet is concerned, we find some similarities between Rancière and Febvre.
Where Fevbre called for a history of psychological states, sentiments and
emotions, which found application in the histoire des mentalités, Rancière saw fit
instead to restore the place of the mot without scaffolding. There is a connection
to be found between Foucault’s advocacy for a direct reading of archival
statements, and Rancière’s restoration of the mot. While it is my position that the
histoire des mentalités answered the concerns of Michelet more directly, there is
something to be said for the rigor of both Foucault and Rancière in proposing
alternatives to this paradigm.
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Attempt at a Self-Criticism
Now that the findings of my research have been condensed and stated, it is time
to point out the issues contained therein.
The first and most obvious concern to raise is the number of authors left out or
given a marginal role in my work. In terms of theorists, why did I not include Michel de
Certeau, Pierre Nora, Maurice Halbwachs, Pierre Bourdieu and François Hartog? Each
of these thinkers are natural fits for the subject material, and in many cases, more
obvious choices than those thinkers I did choose to analyze. I now recognize places
where these theorists would have enabled me to say more with less. Their exclusion was
not calculated, but simply a logistical oversight of catching my reading up to my
writing.
The same can be said of my selection of historians. I regret at this late hour not
including more of the works of Natalie Zemon Davis, as I originally planned to include
the figure of Jean de Coras from The Return of Martin Guerre (p. 94 - 103) as a case study
for my third chapter. The exclusion of Ernest Labrousse, the Chaunus, Michel Vovelle
and Georges Duby was to conserve space, as I found I could explain similar ideas with
other authors. Finally, I chose not to write on the generation of thinkers prior to the
Annales, such as Henri Pirenne, François Simiand, Henri Berr, and Paul Vidal de la
Blache, in order to give some chronological boundary to the scope of my research. I
never intended to write an exhaustive history of the Annales movement, as better sources
than I could hope to produce already exist.
An apt criticism to raise is that the concepts explored in this work are not
relevant enough to the dominant interests or trends of academic history as it is practiced
today. Why did I study a set of Eurocentric thinkers? Why did I not see fit to include
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more feminist, queer and postcolonial criticism? In historical study, luminaries who
anticipate future consensus are exceptions, not the rule. It is difficult to find fault with
the past for not containing the innovations of the present. I now realize that I might have
counter-acted these gaps by including more contemporary scholars. While I did manage
to find the works of Sanjay Subrahmanya and Ranajit Guha, who applied Annales
concepts to India, I do not consider myself well versed on the international reception
history of the school. These concerns would have been difficult to integrate, although
subaltern, feminist and/or queer theorists might find something of value in my third
chapter.
There are also the external constraints to consider. Theses at the Centre for
Theory and Criticism are required to contain “formal statements of theory” and as such
are required to reference the work of a small canon of authors. This is primarily the
reason for the attention paid to Michel Foucault. Further, Theses in the Centre are
required to meet a certain standard of interdisciplinary research. While I consider it a bit
of a catachresis to call an individual’s effort interdisciplinary (rather than reserving the
term to describe the research of a group on a particular problem), this standard was also
formative for the course of my research, insofar as meeting it required some breadth.
One unique aspect of my research is that I assembled and discussed the texts in
which historiography is engaged by Foucault and Rancière, but also other “French
theorists” like Roland Barthes and Paul Ricœur. While there are similar themes in these
engagements, like causality, agency and representation, each have particular topics.
While Ricœur, reflecting on the Annales and other French historians, figures them as a
contribution to a theory of history, Foucault drew from the serial historians of the
Annales in order to support his method of discontinuity. Foucault transformed some of
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the Annales concepts in his own applications, such as the concept of ‘event.’ The impetus
to theorize this concept clearly comes from the Annales historians, in their attempt to
distance their own histories from positivistic chronicles. Further applications of this
concept ought to take this impetus into account. Rancière, while perhaps engaging Furet
above the other Annalistes, primarily reads the Annales in order to criticize their political
claims, and their claims to scientific legitimacy. Rancière’s reflections on the politics of
historiography have wider implications, which are beyond the scope of this research.
We also find that Rancière’s criticisms did find application in his own historical works,
like The Nights of Labor, which created a history from partial evidence, and which
features the voices of those who make up those histories. I included analyses of the
historical works of the Annales, Foucault and also Rancière in order to demonstrate that
their historiographic reflections were not idle, and found applications which
demonstrate their strengths and weaknesses in a more accessible manner.
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Coda: The Antimony of Surface and Depth, a Sketch
Throughout the course of my research, I was often occasioned to reflect on the
differences I have found between the approaches of a group of scholars I studied in my
first thesis, primarily German philosophers and theorists on the subject of history, and
the theorists and historians of this work.
The German authors I have studied tended to pay more attention to the figure of
the historian, whether Benjamin’s Flâneur reflecting on the similitude of appearances,
Nietzsche’s portraits of the monumental, antiquarian and critical historians, or Siegfried
Kracauer’s historian in the waiting room. Further, these authors were primarily
concerned with the direct political effects of history, whether they found it lacking, as in
the case of Nietzsche, or deeply troubling, à la Benjamin and Koselleck. As such, they
supplement a lack of concern with the place, position and figure of the historian in
French thought.
In contrast, the French authors tended to pay far more attention to deep stratum
of the historical past, often without direct relevance for the present. Often, this was an
intentional gesture, as in the case of the histoire des mentalités, Foucault’s rejection of pastas-origin, or Rancière’s mass of paper. Between German and French thinkers, each
assumes a locui of history, whether the archive or the public square. I consider this
difference to represent an antimony in 20th century historical thought, the antimony of
surface and depth. Admittedly, these are general contours likely to admit of exception.
However, it would be interesting to engage these differences in the course of further
research, and satisfying to soothe my impulse to revise my earlier work and temper
some of its more excessive claims.
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Burguière, André. The Annales School: An Intellectual History. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2009.
Burke, Peter. New Perspectives on Historical Writing. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania
State UP, 1992.

Guzzi 98

Burrow, John. A History of Histories: Epics, Chronicles, Romances and Inquiries from
Herodotus and Thucydides. London: Penguin, 2009.
Calcagno, A. (2007) “Abolishing Time and History: Lazarus and the Possibility of
Thinking Political Events Outside Time” Journal of French Philosophy. 17(2). 13-36
Carrard, Philippe. Poetics of the New History: French Historical Discourse from Braudel to
Chartier. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1992.
Carroll, David. The Subject in Question: The languages of Theory and the Strategies of Fiction.
Chicago: U of Chicago, 1982.
Chartier, Roger. "Intellectual History or Sociocultural History? The French Trajectories."
Modern European Intellectual History: Reappraisals and New Perspectives. Ed.
Dominick LaCapra and Steven L. Kaplan. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1982. 13-45.
———.

“The Chimera of the Origin: Archaeology of Knowledge, Cultural History, and the
French Revolution” in On the Edge of the Cliff: History, Language, and Practices.
Trans. Lydia G. Cochrane. Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 1997.

———.

Cultural History Between Practices and Representations, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1988.

Cronin, Joseph. Foucault’s Antihumanist Historiography. Lewiston, NY: E. Mellen, 2001.
Cusset, François. French Theory: How Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, & Co. Transformed the
Intellectual Life of the United States. Trans. Jeff Fort. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota,
2008.
de Tocqueville, Alexis. The Old Régime and the French Revolution. New York, Anchor
Books, 1955.
Dean, Mitchell. Critical and Effective Histories: Foucault’s methods and historical sociology.
New York: Routledge, 1994.
Deleuze, Gilles. Foucault. Trans, Sean Hand. Minneapolis, U of Minnesota, 1988.
Durkheim, Emile “History, Function and Cause” 1902, Selected Writings. Trans.
Anthony Giddens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 78-9.
Duschinsky, Robbie, and Leon Antonio Rocha, eds. Foucault, the Family and Politics.
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
Febvre Lucien. Albert Mathiez : un tempérament, une éducation. In: Annales d'histoire
économique et sociale, 4e année, N. 18, 1932. pp. 573-576.

Guzzi 99
———.

A New Kind of History: And Other Essays. Ed. Peter Burke. Trans. K. Folca. New
York: Harper & Row, 1973.

Foucault, Michel, ed. I, Pierre Rivière, Having Slaughtered My Mother, My Sister and My
Brother--: A Case of Parricide in the 19th Century. Lincoln: U of Nebraska, 1982.
Foucault, Michel. "The Archeology of Knowledge." Foucault Live: (interviews, 1961-1984).
Ed. Sylvère Lotringer. New York, NY: Semiotext(e), 1989. 45-56.
———.

“History, Discourse and Discontinuity.” Trans Anthony M. Nazzara. Salmagundi 20
(1972): 225-48.

———.

“On the Ways of Writing in History” in Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology. Ed.
James D. Faubion. New York: New, 1998.

———.

“The Lives of Infamous Men” in Power: Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984.
Volume 3. Ed. James D. Faubion. Trans. Robert Hurley et al. New York: The New
York Press.

———.

Power/knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977. Ed. Colin
Gordon. New York: Pantheon, 1980.

———.

Religion and Culture. Ed. Jeremy R. Carrette. New York: Routledge, 1999.

———.The

Archaeology of Knowledge; And, The Discourse on Language. Trans. A.M. Sheridan

Smith. New York: Pantheon, 1972.
———.The

Birth of the Clinic; an Archaeology of Medical Perception. Trans. A.M. Sheridan.

New York: Routledge, 1973.
———.The

Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. New York: Pantheon,

1971.
Giddens, Anthony. "Elements of the Theory of Structuration." The Constitution of Society:
Outline of the Theory of Structuration. Cambridge: Polity, 1984. 1-34.
Ginzburg, Carlo. The Judge and the Historian: Marginal Notes on a Late twentieth-century
Miscarriage of Justice. Trans. Antony Shugaar London: Verso, 1999.
Guha, Ranajit. ‘On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India,’ Subaltern Studies I,
Oxford University Press (New Delhi), 1981
Hartog, François. Regimes of Historicity: Presentism and Experiences of Time. Trans. Saskia
Brown. Columbia UP, 2015.

Guzzi 100

Hook, Sidney. The Hero in History; a Study in Limitation and Possibility. Boston: Beacon,
1955.
Hughes, H. Stuart. The Obstructed Path; French Social Thought in the Years of Desperation,
1930-1960. New York: Harper & Row, 1968.
Koselleck, Reinhart. Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time. Trans. Keith Tribe.
New York: Columbia University Press, 2004.
———.

The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts. Trans. Todd
Samuel Presner et al. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002.

Kritzman, Lawrence D., and Brian J. Reilly, eds. The Columbia History of Twentieth-century
French Thought. Trans. M. B. DeBevoise. New York: Columbia UP, 2006.
Kusch, Martin. Foucault’s Strata and Fields: An Investigation into Archaeological and
Genealogical Science Studies. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1991.
Ladurie, Emmanuel Le Roy. Montaillou: The Promised Land of Error. New York: 1978.
Ladurie, Emmanuel Le Roy. Times of Feast, times of Famine: A History of Climate since the
Year 1000. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1971.
Le Goff, Jacques, and Pierre Nora. Constructing the Past: Essays in Historical Methodology.
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1985.
Le Goff, Jacques. Time, Work & Culture in the Middle Ages. Chicago: U of Chicago, 1980.
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Appendix A: Model Syllabus
History and Theory: The Problem of Historiographic Determinism
This seminar aims explore the tension between history and theory through three
interwoven controversies. The main theme explored in these controversies is
determinism in history. Do descriptions of structures and trends having binding status
on the individuals and groups contained therein? How can historians realistically
demonstrate human agency in their work? Is it possible to write the history of a
problem, rather than the history of a period? In order to give sense to these questions,
we will relate this overarching problem to three modules throughout the course.
First, we will study the Annales historians, by exploring the controversy surrounding the
research agenda known as l’histoire des mentalités. In this research agenda, and its
applications, we encounter some new imperatives of 20th century historical scholarship:
how to faithfully represent very remote historical periods as autonomous units? How to
analyze phenomena through indirect historical evidence, such as emotion and
sentiment? Can these insights enable us understand the present?
Second, we will examine how the problem of causality found new applications in
the work of Fernand Braudel and Michel Foucault. We will compare their research
agendas, and then compare these agendas with historical works from both thinkers that
describe the same events. Between these authors, we encounter two novel solutions to
etiological problems raised by l’histoire des mentalités. Can we avoid causal determinism
in historical writing through a description of structures and trends? How then, to
describe changes and transformations in these structures? Is it possible to reconcile
historical experience with historical transition?
Third, we will read the theoretical work of Jacques Rancière. In doing so, we will
apply our earlier findings to the questions of agency, trace and reconstruction found in
The Names of History. Here, Rancière proposes a model of historical reconstruction based
on of the impartial appropriation of the past for revolutionary means. Is it possible to
reconstruct the past through impartial evidence? What does this tell us about the
historical development of historiography? We will explore these issues by reading a
work of historical reconstruction, The Return of Martin Guerre, by Natalie Zemon Davis,
with special attention to the sections on our witness to the events, Jean De Coras.
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1: Introduction: Does History Need Theory?
Koselleck, Reinhart. "The Need for Theory in the Discipline of History." Trans. Kerstin
Behnke. The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts. Ed.
Todd Samuel Presner. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2002. 1-19.
Novack, George. “Major Theories of History from the Greeks to Marxism” in
Understanding History
<https://www.marxists.org/archive/novack/works/history/ch04.htm>
2: Survey of Literature
Ricœur, Paul. The Contribution of French Historiography to the Theory of History. Oxford:
Clarendon, 1980.
Module I – Mentalités and determinism
3: Mentalités as Research Agenda
Febvre, Lucien. "Sensibility and History: How to Reconstitute the Emotional Life of the
past" & “Witchcraft: nonsense or a mental revolution?” A New Kind of History:
From the Writings of Febvre. Trans. Peter Burke. London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1973. 12-26; 185-192.
4: Mentalités; Applied Agenda
Ariès, Philippe. Western Attitudes toward Death: From the Middle Ages to the Present. Trans.
Patricia M. Ranum. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1974.
Barthes, Roland. "For a Psychosociology of the Contemporary Diet." Histories: French
Constructions of the past. Ed. Jacques Revel and Lynn Hunt. New York: New, 1998.
90-98
Goff, Jacques Le. "Merchants Time and Church’s Time in the Middle Ages." Time, Work
& Culture in the Middle Ages. Trans. Arthur Goldhammer. Chicago: U of Chicago,
1980. 29-42.
5: Mentalités and determinism
"Mentalities: A History of Ambiguities." Constructing the Past: Essays in Historical
Methodology. Ed. Jacques Le Goff and Pierre Nora. Cambridge: Cambridge UP,
1985. 166-80.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Gay Science: With a Prelude in German Rhymes and an Appendix of
Songs. Ed. Bernard Williams. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge UP, 2001. 34-35; 175.
(§§ 7, 308) ‘Something for the industrious’ & ‘The history of everyday’
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Recommended:
Ricœur, Paul. "Promoting the History of Mentalities." Memory, History, Forgetting.
Chicago: U of Chicago, 2004. 188-200.
Module II- Method, Structure and Causality
6: Research Agendas of Braudel and Foucault
Braudel, Fernand. "The Longue Durée." On History. Trans. Sarah Matthews. Chicago: U
of Chicago, 1980. 25-54.
Foucault, Michel. "Introduction” & “Archaeology and the History of Ideas." The
Archaeology of Knowledge. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Pantheon, 1972. 3-17;
135-140.
Recommended:
Chartier, Roger. "The Chimera of the Origin: Archaeology of Knowledge, Cultural
History, and the French Revolution." Trans. Lydia G. Cochrane. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins UP, 1997. 51-71.
7: Foucault and Braudel on Health in the 18th Century
Braudel, Fernand. "The Eighteenth Century: Watershed of Biological Regimes."
Civilization and Capitalism: 15th-18th Century: The Structures of Everyday Life. Trans.
Siân Reynolds. Vol. 1. London: Collins, 1984. 70-91.
Foucault, Michel. "The Politics of Health in the 18th Century." Power/knowledge: Selected
Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977. Ed. Colin Gordon. New York: Pantheon,
1980. 166-82.
8: History from Below and the Politics of Historiography
Hobsbawm, E. J. "On History from Below." On History. New York: New, 1997. 201-16.
Rancière, Jacques. ‘“Le social”: the lost tradition in French Labour history,’ in People’s
History and Socialist Theory, ed. Raphael Samuel. London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 267-72.
Recommended:
Lüdtke, Alf. "What Is the History of Everyday Life and Who Are Its Practitioners." The
History of Everyday Life: Reconstructing Historical Experiences and Ways of Life.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1995. 3-30.
Badiou, Alain. "Rancière and the Community of Equals Rancière and Apolitics."
Metapolitics. Trans. Jason Barker. London: Verso, 2005. 107-23.

Guzzi 106

Module III – Agency, Trace and Reconstruction
9: Rancière: The Appropriation of Names
Rancière, Jacques. "A Secular Battle"& "the Dead King" The Names of History: On the
Poetics of Knowledge. Trans. Hassan Melehy. Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota,
1994. 1-23.
Supplement:
Tacitus. The Annals of Imperial Rome. 1.16.
Hobbes. The Leviathan. Ch. 17. / De cive V.5
10: Rancière: Historiographic Representation
Rancière, Jacques. “The Excess of Words” & “ The Founding Narrative” The Names of
History: On the Poetics of Knowledge. Trans. Hassan Melehy. Minneapolis, MN: U
of Minnesota, 1994. 24-60.
Supplement:
Aristotle. Poetics. 1447a.
11: Rancière: Historiographic Reconstruction
Rancière, Jacques. “A Heretical History” The Names of History: On the Poetics of
Knowledge. Trans. Hassan Melehy. Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota, 1994. 88103.
Supplement:
Barthes, Roland. "Death-as-sleep and Death-as-sun." Michelet. Trans. Richard Howard.
New York: Hill and Wang, 1987. 81-97.
12: Case Study; the role of Jean de Coras
Davis, Natalie Zemon. The Return of Martin Guerre. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1983.
esp: 94-122.
Supplement:
Foucault, Michel. "Lives of Infamous Men." Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984. Ed.
James D. Faubion. London: Penguin, 2002. 157-75.
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